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INTRODUCTION
Veterinary medicine has gone through tremendous changes
in the past several decades. Until fairly recently, veterinary
practice was viewed primarily as a “service profession to
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agriculture,”2 that involved many rote practices such as
vaccinating herds of cows. In contrast, today’s veterinary
practice focuses much more heavily on companion animal3
medicine and includes such specialty areas as veterinary
oncology, veterinary orthopedics, veterinary cardiology, and
even veterinary ophthalmology.4 In the ten years from 1991 to
2001, spending on veterinary care increased nearly three-fold,
with expenditures totaling over nineteen billion dollars.5
Many of these changes can be attributed to the changing
relationship that people have with their animals, and the
growing role that our pets, or companion animals, play in our
lives. Because of the way we value our pets, we are much more
likely to spend money on their care, purchase pet health
insurance, and expect that they will receive medical care when
they are sick or injured akin to the treatment choices available in
human medicine.6 In an interesting example of “coming full
BERNARD E. ROLLIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO VETERINARY MEDICAL ETHICS:
THEORY AND CASES 58-59 (1999).
2

3 Id. at 56.
See also Christopher Green, Comment, The Future of
Veterinary Malpractice Liability in the Care of Companion Animals, 10
ANIMAL L. 163, 211 (2004) (reporting that the vast majority of private
veterinarians—eighty-three percent—work primarily or exclusively with
companion animals). “Companion animal” practice refers to treating animals
such as dogs, cats and other small pets. See, e.g., Cornell University
College of Veterinary Medicine, Companion Animal Hospital,
http://www.vet.cornell.edu/hospital/companion.htm. Other categories of
practice include equine and “food animal” (bovine, small ruminants,
porcine). See Veterinary Medical Teaching Hospital, Department of
Veterinary
Medicine
and
Surgery,
Food
Animal
Clinic,
http://www.vmth.missouri.edu/large.html (“The food animal clinic
maintains a hospital caseload of approximately 2,000 accessions/yr. This
constitutes one of the busiest food animal caseloads in North America. The
bulk of the caseload consists of traditional agricultural animals, including
beef cattle, dairy cattle, swine, sheep and goats.”)

See, e.g. The Matthew J. Ryan Veterinary Hospital, University
of
Pennsylvania
School
of
Veterinary
Medicine,
Welcome,
www.vet.upenn.edu/ryan; see infra notes 388-389 and accompanying text.
4

5 See Green, supra note 3 at 220 n.323; see also Rita Giordano, The Love
of a Healthy Pet? Priceless, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 20, 2004, at M1, (citing
the American Veterinary Medicine Association).

See Mary Margaret McEachern Nunalee & G. Robert Weedon, Modern
Trends in Veterinary Malpractice: How Our Evolving Attitudes Toward
6
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circle,” many human medical advances that were first tested in
research experiments using animal models are now making
their way back into veterinary medicine to treat sick animals.7
For example, choices of which chemotherapeutic agents to use
to treat cancer in dogs and cats are often informed by which of
those drugs have been successful in treating similar cancers in
human patients.8
The changes in the way we value our animals are just
beginning to be reflected in the law. The traditional legal view
that treats all animals as property is beginning to give way to an
increasing recognition that animals are fundamentally different
from inanimate property, and hence the law needs to treat them
differently. These legal changes are being seen to a limited
extent in tort law — in the way that damages are calculated for
lost or injured animals — but to a much greater extent in other
Non-Human Animals Will Change Veterinary Medicine, 10 ANIMAL L. 125,
139-40 (2004) (discussing pet owners’ desires to pursue sophisticated
treatment and high-tech diagnostic tools for their pets). See also Giordano,
supra note 5 (“[I]ncreasingly, pet owners, acting as their animals’ health
advocates as they might for any family member, are demanding cutting-edge
treatments and sophisticated—and costly—diagnostic procedures . . . .”).
7 See Giordano, supra note 5 (“As the wonders of human medicine make
their way into veterinary medicine at an ever-faster rate, animal care experts
say pet owners . . . are learning how far they can go—and how much they can
spend—to save their animal loved ones.”).
8 See, e.g., Fawn Vrazo, Testing New Drugs, More than a Pet
Cause,
RECORD
ONLINE,
Nov.
16,
2005,
available
at
http://archive.recordonline.com/archive/2005/11/16/gohe2.html
(“But
while more new animal medications are coming to market . . . veterinarians
and animal-welfare groups complain about a continuing lack of drugs that
have been tested and approved specifically for pets. There are no approved
animal cancer chemotherapy drugs or diabetes drugs, for instance. . . .”);
Jenny Donelan, Chemo Can Give a Dog and Owner More
Time, BOSTON GLOBE, May 26, 2005, at H3, available at
http://www.boston.com/yourlife/home/articles/2005/05/26/chemo_can_g
ive_a_dog_and_owner_more_time/; Warren King, What Price a Pet’s Life?:
$45,000 to Treat Comet, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 6, 2005, at A1 available at
http:seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2002232414_dogtransplan
t06m.html (noting that “[p]et owners may pay thousands for treatments once
reserved for humans, including kidney transplants, gall-stone removal, hip
replacements, and chemotherapy, radiation and surgery for cancer.”). See
also Giordano, supra note 5 (reporting that University of Pennsylvania
researchers are working on a tumor vaccine for both children and for pets).

317

Winter 2007

Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy

Vol 4:2

areas of the law, such as estate planning, custody decisions, and
increasing criminal penalties for cruelty to animals.
These legal changes, inspired no doubt by the changes in the
way we value companion animals in our society, may have
implications for veterinary medicine and education that go
beyond the changes in societal values that inspired them. The
potential effects on veterinary malpractice liability and damages
awards have recently been explored by a number of
commentators.9 Other potential effects have received less
attention, such as how these changes are affecting the
professional role of veterinarians, the realities of their practices,
and their abilities to exercise their professional judgment.
This article seeks to explore such implications of the legal
changes we are beginning to see by focusing on the changing
legal status of companion animals. It will advocate for
continuing a nascent movement away from the law’s traditional
approach of treating all non-human animals as property,
propose a new legal category for companion animals, and
discuss the implications of these changes for the veterinary
profession.
Part I will set out the traditional legal view where all animals
are treated as property. This status is seen in cases involving an
animal that is injured or lost through another’s negligence,
where the owner10 is only able to recover the animal’s fair
market value, and when “lost property” statutes are used to
9 See, e.g., Green, supra note 3, at 163; Rebecca J. Huss, Valuation in
Veterinary Malpractice, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 479 (2004) [hereinafter Huss,
Valuation in Veterinary Malpractice]; Jayne De Young, Article, Toward a
More Equitable Approach to Causation in Veterinary Malpractice Actions,
16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 201 (2005).

One state and several local jurisdictions have statutorily
changed this status from “owner” to “guardian.” See, e.g.,
R.I.
GEN.
LAWS
§ 4-13-1.2(6), (10)
and
§ 4-19-2(28)
(2006)
(adding
the
definition
of
“Guardian”
but
not
removing
“Owner keeper”); BOULDER, COLO., CODE § 6-1-2 (1985), available at
http://www.bouldercolorado.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie
w&id=1856&Itemid=655
(“‘Guardian’
means
owner”);
BERKELEY,
CAL.,
CODE
§ 10.04.010
(2001),
available
at
http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/bmc/berkeley%5Fmunicipal%5Fcode/title%5F
10/04/010.html (defining “Owner/guardian”); S.F., CAL., CODE art. I § 41(m)
(2003) (allowing “guardian” and “owner” to be used interchangeably in the
Code).
10
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resolve disputes between losers and finders of lost animals. Part
II will explore some recent changes in both case and statutory
law that may be recognizing a different status for some
animals.11 This section will conclude, however, that these
judicial and legislative changes do not clearly reflect a change in
the legal status of companion animals, but may rather merely
indicate a different way of valuing this form of property.
Part III will look at other areas where the law more clearly
recognizes a different legal status for at least some animals. In
some cases, this recognition is seen in the language used by
courts, whether or not that language actually affects the
outcome of the decision.12 The article will argue that the
language seen in these opinions reflects, at a minimum, an
increasing discomfort that judges have with the legal status quo,
and an increasing awareness that current laws are in conflict
with the reality of how many people view their animals. This
part of the article will then turn to case law and statutes that
more clearly recognize a change in the legal status of companion
animals.13 This section will conclude that there is in fact a trend
to change the legal status of animals, a trend that more
accurately reflects the value of companion animals in our
society.
There are a number of different ways in which courts have held the
value of companion animals to exceed fair market value, including allowing
recovery of “reasonable veterinary expenses” even when those expenses far
exceed animal’s market value; allowing recovery of “actual or intrinsic” value
above market value; allowing recovery for an animal’s companionship and
protective value; and allowing recovery of amounts that recognize the loss of
companionship and mental suffering of the animal’s owner. See infra notes
52-123 and accompanying text.
11

12

See infra notes 132-145 and accompanying text.

13 Examples will include a Vermont case where the majority refused to
apply a lost property statute to resolve a dispute between the loser and finder
of a dog, despite the language in the statute that specified its application to
“stray beasts” (see infra notes 150-164 and accompanying text); cases
involving the custody of dogs and cats where courts apply a “best interest”
standard (see infra notes 1677-173 and accompanying text); and cases and
statutes in the area of Estates and Trusts, including judicial decisions voiding
clauses in wills that instruct that pets be destroyed and legislation that allows
for the creation of binding pet trusts (see infra notes 174-213 and
accompanying text).
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Part IV of the article proposes that the above-described legal
changes be formally recognized by creating a new legal category
for companion animals. This section will explore what that legal
category might be, and how it could clarify, in ways that our
current laws do not, the responsibilities that owners have
toward their living property that are fundamentally different
from responsibilities toward inanimate property. Such a
category should thus take into account the dependence that
companion animals have on their human owners, their capacity
to suffer if mistreated or neglected, and the bonds that we and
our animals form with each other. This section will advocate an
incremental change that retains the property status of
companion animals but accords them a place above inanimate
property. It will also look at the implications of creating
additional legal distinctions both between14 and within15 species.
The final section, Part V, will look at the implications of such
a change on the veterinary profession. The profession has
shown some organized opposition to any changes in the legal
status of animals. This section will respond to that opposition
and will argue that it ultimately is misplaced: while
veterinarians have some legitimate fears about increased
malpractice awards, these fears are generally overblown, and
they are far outweighed by the numerous ways their profession
will benefit from enhancing the legal status of companion
animals. This section will conclude that it is ultimately in the
best interest of the profession to support incremental changes in
the legal status of companion animals – above that of inanimate
property but not equivalent to personhood.

While many laws, such as the Federal Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§
2131-2159 (2007), and many state animal cruelty statutes, already treat
animals differently by species, most of the recent legal changes apply only in
cases of companion animals and will therefore increase the distinctions
between species.
14

15 To the extent that our legal rules depend on the animals’ roles in lives
of humans, it is unclear how the law will treat animals within the same
species that have different roles.
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PART I: TRADITIONAL VIEW OF ANIMALS AS
PROPERTY
The law has traditionally treated all non-human animals,
including pets, as property.16 Animals are generally categorized
as either wild or domestic. Pets, or companion animals, are one
of several types of domestic animals.17 Wild animals are
considered to be owned by the state18 (although that ownership
can, in certain circumstances, be transferred to individuals),
while domestic animals have individual owners.19 In many
respects, our ownership of animals is identical to our ownership
of inanimate property: we can buy and sell them, bequeath them
in our wills, give them away, or choose to “destroy” them.20 Pet
16 See, e.g., Gary L. Francione, Introduction: Animals as Property, 2
ANIMAL L., at *2 (1996) [hereinafter Francione, Animals as Property];
Harold W. Hannah, Animals as Property – Changing Concepts, 25 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 571, 572 (2001). See also Harabes v. The Barkery, Inc., 791 A.2d 1142,
1144 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001) (“A review of decisions from other states
reveals that pets are usually classified as personal property . . . .”).

See Rebecca J. Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best Friend: The
Moral and Legal Status of Companion Animals, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 47, 69
(2002) (citing JAMES F. WILSON, LAW AND ETHICS OF THE VETERINARY
PROFESSION 74 (1988)) [hereinafter Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best
Friend]. See also Hannah, supra note 16, at 574-75.
17

See Hannah, supra note 16, at 572 (footnote omitted) (“While statutory
provisions declare that ownership of wildlife is in the state, that ownership
may be transferred to hunters and anglers providing they meet the licensing
requirements and abide by hunting and fishing rules established in the
state.”). But see David Favre, New Property Status for Animals: Equitable
Self-Ownership, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS
234, 237 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004) [hereinafter
ANIMAL RIGHTS] (arguing that “[i]t is a misperception of existing property law
to say that title is in the state when wildlife exists in its natural
environment.”).
18

19 Gary L. Francione, Animals – Property or Persons?, in ANIMAL RIGHTS,
supra note 18, at 108, 116 [hereinafter Francione, Property or Persons?].

See id. at 117. State statutes prohibiting animal cruelty do, however,
place some limits on how we treat our animal property, and while they do
place limits on an owner’s choice of how to have an animal killed, they
generally do not question an owner’s choice to have an animal humanely
euthanized for what may be a trivial reason. See, e.g., ROLLIN, supra note 2,
at 60 (referring to “euthanizing animals for trivial reasons”).
20
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animals, like other forms of personal property, can be the
subjects of theft21 and subjects of bailment agreements.22 If we
leave our animals at the veterinarian’s office beyond a certain
period of time, or do not pay our bill, the professionals can take
ownership of them in much the same way that a garage can take
ownership of our cars.23
This animal-as-property approach is frequently seen in tort
cases involving damages for a negligently lost or injured animal,
where courts are only willing to award the “fair market value” as
they would for any other form of property. For example,
plaintiffs in an Alaska case located their missing dog at a local
pound and attempted to retrieve him.24 Told that the pound was
closed for the day, they arrived earlier the next day after leaving
work early. 25 They found, however, that the pound had already
killed their dog, in violation of a local ordinance that required a
seventy-two hour holding period.26
The pound admitted
liability and the only issue at trial was damages.27 In affirming
See, e.g., 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 459-601(a) (West 2007) (“All dogs
are hereby declared to be personal property and subjects of theft.”). See also
the Federal Pet Theft Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2007) (stating that among the
Animal Welfare Act’s purposes is “to protect the owners of animals from the
theft of their animals.”).
21

22 See, e.g., Price v. Brown, 680 A.2d 1149, 1151 (Pa. 1996) (holding that,
while dogs are personal property and can thus be subjects of bailment
agreements, “allegations of breach of a bailment agreement are insufficient to
state a cause of action against a veterinarian who . . . perform[s] surgery on
an animal” that does not survive).
23 See, e.g., 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 459-601(c)(2) (West 2007) (setting
forth provision regarding abandonment of animals where an “animal placed
in the custody of a licensed doctor of veterinary medicine for treatment,
boarding or other care, . . . which shall be abandoned by its owner or his
representative for a period of more than ten days after written notice . . . may
be turned over to the custody of the nearest humane society.”).

Richardson v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454, 455 (Alaska

24

1985).
25

Id.

26

Id.

27

Id.
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the lower court’s jury instructions, the Alaska Supreme Court
held that the proper measure of damages was the market value
of the dog and not the owner’s subjective estimation of the pet’s
value.28
The legal status of animals as property is also apparent when
“lost property” law is used to resolve disputes between losers
and finders of lost animals,29 and where property dissolution
law is used to determine a pet’s fate during a divorce settlement.
In a recent Pennsylvania case, for example, former spouses had
entered into a property settlement agreeing that their dog would
live with the wife, but allowing the husband to visit him.30
When the wife moved and no longer allowed her former
husband to visit the dog, he filed a complaint seeking shared
custody.31 The court dismissed the complaint, holding that any
terms in the agreement attempting to award visitation or shared
custody were void, because dogs are considered personal
property under Pennsylvania law.32 In affirming the trial court’s
dismissal, the Superior Court agreed that “Appellant is seeking
an arrangement analogous, in law, to a visitation schedule for a
table or a lamp.”33

28 Id. at 456. The court stated that it was, however, willing to recognize a
cause of action for intentional inflection of emotional distress “for the
intentional or reckless killing of a pet animal in an appropriate case.” Id. The
court did not find this to be such a case; it affirmed the lower court’s
determination that the Richardson’s emotional distress was not severe
enough to warrant this claim. Id. See also Mitchell v. Heinrichs, 27 P.3d 309,
313 (Alaska 2001) (footnote omitted) (“The majority rule holds that the
proper measure of recovery for the killing of a dog is the dog’s fair market
value at the time of its death.”). The Mitchell court, however, chose the
minority position and awarded damages representing “the actual value of the
pet to the owner.” Id.

See, e.g., Williams v. McMahan, No. 26983-0-II, 2002 WL 242538
(Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2002).
29

30

See Desanctis v. Pritchard, 803 A.2d 230, 231 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).

31

Id.

32

Id. at 232 (citing 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 459-601(a)).

33

Id.
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Despite their treatment as property in many areas of the law,
there are other ways in which animals have long been treated
differently from non-animate property: state statutes
prohibiting cruelty to animals have been on the books since as
early as the 1800s34 and, by some accounts, go back as early as
1641 to the legal code of Massachusetts Bay Colony.35 No
similar laws exist that prohibit “cruelty” to inanimate property.
Animals are treated differently from inanimate property in
practical ways as well. Unlike other “property,” animals possess
an ability to move that can be exercised independently from
their owner’s wishes, and certain laws that recognize this ability
exist, if for no other reason than to assure an original owner’s
property right.36
While valuing animals as property is still the prevailing view,
there have been some recent changes in both case and statutory
law that may be recognizing a different status for some animals.
In cases involving the calculation of damage awards, the
changes may not so clearly reflect a change in the legal status of
companion animals, but rather may merely indicate a different
way of valuing this form of property.37 In other cases,
recognition of a different status for companion animals can be
seen in the language used by courts, whether or not that
language actually affects the outcome of the decision.38 And in
yet other examples of changes in both case and statutory law, we
Gary Francione cites an 1821 Maine statute as “[t]he first known anticruelty statute in the United States.” See Francione. Property or Persons?,
supra note 19, at 135 n.14. Other commentators cite to a New York statute
that dates to 1866. See, e.g., William A. Reppy, Jr., Citizen Standing to
Enforce Anti-Cruelty Laws by Obtaining Injunctions: The North Carolina
Experience, 11 ANIMAL L. 39, 46 n.38 (2005) (citing N.Y. REV. STAT. ch. 783,
1-10 (1866)).
34

This “Body of Liberties” prohibited “any Tirrany or Crueltie towards
any bruite Creature which are usuallie kept for man’s use.” Cass R. Sunstein,
Can Animals Sue?, in ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 251, 252 [hereinafter
Sunstein, Can Animals Sue?].
35

36 See GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 41 (1995)
(describing the historical legal classes of animals, domestic or wild, and the
property rights assigned to each class).
37

See infra Part II.

38

See infra Part III A.
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see results that more clearly recognize a change in the legal
status of companion animals.39

PART II: CHANGES IN DAMAGE AWARDS
A great deal of scholarly attention has been paid to the
problems with using fair market value as a measure of damages
for lost or injured companion animals, and the current approach
has
been
criticized
by
numerous
commentators.40
Commentators have asserted, for example, that the current
approach has failed to “[keep] up with the reality of the
relationship between companion animals and their human
caretakers,”41 because it fails to recognize the value that many
people place on their animals, and leads to both undercompensation42 and under-deterrence43 in many legal disputes,
including the failure to deter veterinarians from harming the
animals in their care.44
39

See infra Part III B.

40 See Elaine T. Byszewski, Valuing Companion Animals in Wrongful
Death Cases: A Survey of Current Court and Legislative Action and a
Suggestion for Valuing Pecuniary Loss of Companionship, 9 ANIMAL L. 215,
225 (2003); Geordie Duckler, The Economic Value of Companion Animals:
A Legal and Anthropological Argument for Special Valuation, 8 ANIMAL L.
199, 200 (2002); Lynn A. Epstein, Resolving Confusion in Pet Owner Tort
Cases: Recognizing Pets’ Anthropomorphic Qualities Under a Property
Classification, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 31, 32 (2001); Huss, Valuing Man’s and
Woman’s Best Friend, supra note 17, at 47; Margit Livingston, The Calculus
of Animal Valuation: Crafting a Viable Remedy, 82 NEB. L. REV. 783 (2004);
William C. Root, Note, “Man’s Best Friend”: Property or Family Member?
An Examination of the Legal Classification of Companion Animals and Its
Impact on Damages Recoverable for Their Wrongful Death or Injury, 47
VILL. L. REV. 423, 444 (2002); Debra Squires-Lee, Note, In Defense of Floyd:
Appropriately Valuing Companion Animals in Tort, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1059,
1087 (1995); Sonia S. Waisman & Barbara R. Newell, Recovery of “NonEconomic” Damages for Wrongful Killing or Injury of Companion Animals:
A Judicial and Legislative Trend, 7 ANIMAL L. 45, 60 (2001).
41

Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best Friend, supra note 17, at 52.

42

See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 40, at 816-17.

43

See, e.g., Byszewski, supra note 40, at 232.

44

See Green, supra note 3, at 168.
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The problem with compensating only for the fair market
value of companion animals is illustrated by a story that was
recently reported in the Philadelphia Inquirer.45 Warren Clein
was standing in his own driveway with his dog, Daisy, when they
were attacked by a neighbor’s Rottweiler that had gotten loose
from its yard.46 Daisy, who was badly injured in the attack, was
taken to Veterinary Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania
(VHUP), where she underwent extensive surgery, and spent five
days in intensive care.47 The bill from VHUP totaled $5,265.
Even in the likely possibility that the Cleins are able to establish
liability on the part of their neighbors, they will not be able to
recover the amount they spent on Daisy’s surgery and
recuperation, because that amount exceeds her “fair market
value” by over $5,000. 48 The Cleins had adopted Daisy, a mixbreed terrier, from a shelter for a $50 fee, and Pennsylvania law
does not allow recovery above the dog’s replacement value.49
45 See Stuart Ditzen, Challenging Pa. Law on a Pet’s Value: Couple Seek to
Recoup Vet Costs after Dog Attack, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 5, 2004, at A01.
46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id.

49 Id. The approach reported in the article is consistent with a 1988 case
where the Pennsylvania Superior Court refused to compensate the owner of a
mixed-breed dog who had been negligently killed for loss of companionship
or emotional distress:

Under Pennsylvania law, a dog is personal property. The
fundamental purpose of damages for an injury to or
destruction of property by tortious conduct of another is to
compensate the injured party for actual loss suffered. . . .
[W]here the property has been destroyed, the measure of
damages would be the value of the property prior to its
destruction. Appellants, however, claim that their dog was a
unique chattel whose value to them exceeded the monetary
value of a mongrel dog. While the appellants undoubtedly
had a sentimental attachment to their dog, this would not
make it unique chattel under the law.
Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858, 864 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (footnote and
citations omitted).
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Inequities with the “fair market value” approach can be
readily seen in the outcome of this case. If Daisy’s “market
value” were really the proper measure of her worth to the Cleins,
then, upon realizing the extent of her injuries, they would have
likely choosen to have her humanely euthanized and then
returned to the shelter for another $50 replacement dog.50 But
few would criticize the Cleins’ decision to take the course they
chose: spending over $5,000 for Daisy’s surgery and
hospitalization so they could have their own dog “made whole.”
If the decision to spend the money on the dog’s surgery was a
reasonable one, and her injuries were caused by another’s
negligence, then it seems to follow that the negligent party
should be liable for paying those damages.51 But that is not
often the outcome when pets are lumped into the same category
as other personal property, and owners can only recover for
their fair market value.
A number of courts, however, are beginning to change their
approach. In cases involving injuries to or losses of companion
animals, there are a number of different ways in which courts
have held their value to exceed “fair market value.” These
approaches include allowing recovery of “reasonable veterinary
expenses” even when those expenses far exceed an animal’s
market value, allowing recovery of “actual or intrinsic” value
above market value (including allowing recovery for an animal’s
companionship and protective value), and allowing recovery of
amounts that recognize the loss of companionship and mental
suffering of the animal’s owner.

See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 40, at 792 n.61 (“[G]iven the hundreds
of thousands of homeless animals in the United States, it is quite simple to
obtain a pet at a relatively low cost.”). But see Green, supra note 3, at 208
(noting that the magazine DVM termed the choice of euthanasia over
treatment “economic euthanasia” and that owners’ dollar-figure cutoff has
been rising, indicating more than simple replacement cost is involved (citing
Daniel R. Verdon, Clients Spending More Before Stopping Treatment, DVM
MAG., June 2003, at 1)).
50

51 Holding the Rottweiler’s owner liable would likely serve not only the
tort system’s “corrective justice” goals, but also the instrumental goal of risk
distribution, since such liability is likely to be covered by one’s homeowner’s
insurance.
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A. REASONABLE VETERINARY EXPENSES
In a case with facts remarkably similar to the Pennsylvania
case described above, a New Jersey court allowed recovery of
reasonable veterinary expenses even when those expenses
exceeded the animal’s market value by fivefold.52 Heather
Hyland’s ten-year-old Shih Tzu was attacked and seriously
injured by a neighbor’s Bulldog that had trespassed onto her
property; Hyland spent $2,500 on treatment for her dog, five
times more than the cost of buying a new Shih Tzu.53 The
defendant Bulldog-owners appealed the award of Hyland’s
veterinary expenses, claiming that the proper measure of
damages for personal property, such as the dog, is its
replacement cost in cases where the “repair costs outweigh the
replacement cost.”54 The court disagreed with this defense,
holding that it was “purely a matter of ‘good sense’ that
defendants be required to ‘make good the injury done’ as the
result of their negligence by reimbursing plaintiff for the
necessary and reasonable expenses she incurred to restore the
dog to its condition before the attack.”55 In reaching this
decision, the court explicitly recognized that pets belong in a
different category from other types of personal property.56
52 Hyland v. Borras, 719 A.2d 662, 663 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). See
also Zager v. Dimilia, 524 N.Y.S.2d 968, 970 (N.Y. Vill. Justice Ct. 1988)
(finding that the proper measure of damages in a case involving injury suffered
by a pet animal is the “reasonable and necessary cost of reasonable veterinary
treatment”).
53

Hyland, 719 A.2d at 662.

54

Id. at 663.

55 Id. at 664. The court went on to say that “[i]mposing these economic
losses on defendants not only has the salutary effect of making plaintiff
whole, but it deters an owner of an aggressive dog from negligently allowing
it to run loose, such as occurred here.” Id.
56

See id.:
Most animals kept for companionship have no calculable
market value beyond the subjective value of the animal to its
owner, and that value arises purely as the result of their
relationship and the length and strength of the owner’s
attachment to the animal. In that sense then, a household
pet is not like other fungible or disposable property,
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Other states rely on legislative changes to recognize
reasonable veterinary expenses as a measure of damages for
injured companion animals.
For example, in a recently
approved amendment to a Maryland statute that otherwise
limits damages for the injury or death of a pet to compensatory
damages, the legislature expanded the definition of
“compensatory damages” to include “the reasonable and
necessary cost of veterinary care” in cases involving either the
death or injury to a pet.57 By recognizing that veterinary
expenses, which may greatly exceed an animal’s market value,
properly can be recovered when an animal is killed or injured
through another’s negligence, both courts and legislators are
finding that fair market value, alone, is often not a proper
measure of damages.

B. ACTUAL VALUE TO OWNER
Several courts have allowed recovery amounts above an
animal’s market value by taking into account the animal’s
intrinsic value or its actual value to its owner. In Brousseau v.
Rosenthal, for example, the court awarded damages when an
eight-year-old mixed breed dog was negligently killed at
defendant’s boarding kennel.58 While finding that the dog had
“no ascertainable market value,” the court nevertheless held
that, in order to make the owner whole, it must assess the dog’s
actual value to its owner.59 The owner in this case was an
elderly woman who lived alone and relied on the dog for
companionship and protection.60 The court therefore included
loss of companionship61 and protection value as elements of
damages.62
intended solely to be used and replaced after it has outlived
its usefulness.
57

MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-110(a)(2) (West 2006).

58

443 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980).

59

Id. at 286.

60

Id.

Note, however, that courts in various jurisdictions, including New
York, have traditionally rejected loss of companionship as an independent
61
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Another approach to calculating the animal’s actual value to
its owner is to look at what the owners have been willing to
spend on the animal, including their investments in the pet’s
veterinary care. In a case involving one neighbor’s shooting of
another’s dog, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the trial
court’s dismissal of the case, which was based on the grounds
that no compensatory damages were available because the dog
had no market value.63 In reversing, the Alaska Supreme Court
held that the court was correct in its conclusion that damages
could not include either sentimental or companionship value.64
Nevertheless, the court found that the correct measure of
compensatory damages was not fair market value, but rather
“value to the owner.”65 The court suggested that there were a
number of different ways to calculate value to the owner:
[A]n owner may seek reasonable replacement
costs — including such items as the cost of
purchasing a puppy of the same breed, the cost of
immunization, the cost of neutering the pet, and
the cost of comparable training. Or an owner may
seek to recover the original cost of the dog,
including the purchase price and, again, such
investments as immunization, neutering, and
training.66

cause of action for the loss of a companion animal. See Gluckman v.
American Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Lewis v. Di Donna
743 N.Y.S.2d 186 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); see also Jankoski v. Preiser Animal
Hosp., Inc., 510 N.E.2d 1084, 1087 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Harabes v. The
Barkery, Inc., 791 A.2d 1142, 1144 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001);
Oberschlake v. Veterinary Assocs. Animal Hosp., 785 N.E.2d 811, 815 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2003); Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
62

Brousseau, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 286.

63

Mitchell v. Heinrichs, 27 P.3d 309 (Alaska 2001).

64

Id. at 312.

65

Id. at 313.

66

Id. at 314.
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While acknowledging that the standard damages calculation
may not adequately compensate the pet owner for the loss,67 the
court reiterated its refusal to include sentimental value68 as a
component of actual value.69
Using similar reasoning, an Ohio court showed a willingness
to adopt an actual value to owner standard when an eight-yearold shepherd was partially paralyzed by negligent surgery.70
Citing the great time and effort the plaintiff had invested in
training her dog, the years she spent trying to rehabilitate him
after his surgery, and the dog’s unique nature as “personally
suited to showing and for [plaintiff’s] personal security,” the
court awarded $5,000 in damages to the plaintiff.71 Like the
Alaska court, however, this court would not include
“sentimentality” as an element of damages.72
More recent cases have attached even higher amounts to a
pet’s value to its owner. In a much publicized 2004 veterinary
malpractice case from Orange County, California – billed in
several news reports73 as the largest damage award to date in a
The court acknowledged in a footnote that “a small minority of
jurisdictions has recognized that the value of a pet dog may include
sentimental or companionship value.” Id. at 313 n.20.
67

68 Even where courts have allowed sentimental value for the loss of a pet,
they may not be treating pets differently than other forms of property which
have little market value, but great value to the person who owns it. In many
ways, this type of valuation mirrors a finding of sentimental value for
property such as heirlooms; however, at least one court in N.Y. has explicitly
distinguished the value of a companion animal from value of an heirloom.
See Corso v. Crawford Cat & Dog Hosp., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1979).
69

Mitchell, 27 P.3d at 314.

70 McDonald v. Ohio State Univ. Veterinary Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 750 (Ct.
Claims Ohio 1994).
71

Id. at 752.

72

Id.

73 See, e.g., Jason Riley, Man Sues Vet Over Dog’s Death, COURIERJOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), July 18, 2005, at 1A; Philip Sherwell, Now Pets Are
Really Part of the Family, Thanks to U.S. “Paw Laws”, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH
(London), June 26, 2005, at 27, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk
(last visited Jan. 23, 2007); Laura Parker, When Pets Die at the Vet, Grieving
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veterinary malpractice case – a jury found that a rescued dog
with a market value of only $10 had a unique value to its owner
that amounted to $30,000.74 And even more recently, a woman
whose cat was mauled by a neighbor’s dog was awarded
approximately $45,000: $30,000 for the pet’s special value and
$15,000 for emotional distress.75

C. MENTAL SUFFERING OF OWNERS AS AN ELEMENT OF
DAMAGES
Courts have shown a general unwillingness to award
damages for the owners’ mental suffering when their companion
animal is injured or killed. In the vast majority of these cases
where claims for mental suffering are disallowed, it is often
because the courts decline to extend such claims to the injury or
death of something that the law considers to be property. In the
few cases where courts have allowed mental distress claims, it is
almost always in the context of a claim for intentional – and not
negligent – infliction of emotional distress, where the behavior
of the defendant has been particularly egregious, enough so to
meet the outrageousness element of the claim. It is not always
clear, in these cases, whether the courts would be similarly
willing to extend emotional distress damages to a loss of
inanimate property. In at least one case, however, a court made
clear that emotional distress damages were in fact available for
the negligent destruction of property.76
Owners Call Lawyers, USA TODAY, Mar. 15, 2005, at 1A, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-03-14-petsmalpractice_x.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
74 See William Hageman, Paw law: Is Your Pet Entitled to his Day in
Court? The Answer: Maybe, CHI. TRIB., June 5, 2005, at Q1. The jury
awarded an additional $9000 in veterinary bills. Id.
75 Warren
Cornwall & Craig Welch, Judge Awards $45,480
in
Cat’s
Death,
SEATTLE
TIMES,
May
9, 2005, available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2002268301_yofi09m.ht
ml (last visited Feb. 9, 2007); Associated Press, Woman gets $45K
for
Cat
Killed
by
Dog,
ABC
NEWS,
May
9,
2005,
http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story?section=News&id=3053530 (last visited
Feb. 9, 2007).
76

1981).

See Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066 (Haw.
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There are numerous examples of cases where courts have
disallowed damages for mental suffering precisely because of
the property status of the killed or injured animal.77 More
unusual are cases like Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station,
where a Hawaii court allowed an emotional distress claim for
the negligent loss of a pet despite the animal’s status as
property.78 The Campbell’s family dog, Princess, died from heat
prostration when the state Animal Quarantine Station
negligently transported her in an unventilated van on a hot
day.79 After hearing evidence of the family’s distress upon
learning of their pet’s death, the trial court found the state liable
and awarded damages both for the loss of the dog and for the
family’s emotional distress.80 Defendants appealed the award of
damages for emotional distress, on the grounds that such
damages were not proper when the loss involved personal
property.81 Hawaii’s Supreme Court rejected this argument,
noting that Hawaii’s “unique approach to the area of recovery
for mental distress .... allowed recovery for mental distress
suffered as the result of the negligent destruction of property.”82
Not surprisingly, this approach has not been followed in other
jurisdictions, which allow negligent infliction of emotional
distress claims only in a narrow range of circumstances.
Courts have shown more of a willingness to award emotional
distress damages when pets are killed or injured due to
intentional, rather than negligent conduct, especially where the
defendant’s behavior is particularly egregious. In Burgess v.
77 See, e.g., Johnson v. Douglas, 723 N.Y.S.2d 627 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001);
Gluckman v. American Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
Harabes v. The Barkery, Inc., 791 A.2d 1142 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2001). See also
Myers v. City of Hartford, 853 A.2d 621, 625 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) (where an
appellate court held that the common law did not recognize emotional
distress claims for “injury to such property as a pet.”).
78

632 P.2d 1066.

79

Id. at 1067.

80

Id.

81

Id. at 1071.

82

Id. (citation omitted).
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Taylor,83 for example, where defendant lied to the plaintiff
horse-owner and sold her horses to a known slaughter-buyer,84
the court rejected defendant’s contention that the award should
have been limited to the horses’ fair market value because of
their status as property.85 Rather, the court found that in
determining whether there is a viable claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, it is “the conduct of the offender
rather than the subject of the conduct that determines whether
the conduct was outrageous.”86 The court thus found a viable
emotional distress claim, despite the horses’ status as property.
The same court next addressed the question of emotional
distress damages for the loss of a pet animal when plaintiffs
brought a claim against the county dog warden for impounding
and shooting their family dog.87 Citing Burgess for the
83

44 S.W.3d 806 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).

Id. at 809. The story’s details highlight the egregious nature of the
defendant’s behavior: Plaintiff Taylor owned two Appaloosa horses, Poco and
P.J., that she kept as pets. Id. When she found herself in circumstances
where she could no longer care for her pet horses, Taylor entered into a "freelease agreement" with defendant Burgess. Id. Under this arrangement,
Burgess, who had a farm with her own horses, would take care of Poco and
P.J. in exchange for the enjoyment of having them; Taylor, in turn, would
remain the horses’ owner and could visit them whenever she liked. Id.
However, within days of taking possession of the horses, Burgess contacted
Jackson, a known slaughter-buyer, and sold the horses to him for $1000. Id.
When Taylor contacted Burgess in an attempt to visit her horses about a
week later, Burgess lied to her, and invented a story about giving them to
Randolph. Id. at 810. Randolph, in turn, gave Taylor vague directions to a
fictitious location, where she tried in vain to search for her horses. Id.
84

85

Id. at 812.

86

Id. at 809. The court went on to find that:
[T]he Burgesses’ conduct clearly rises to the level of
being outrageous and intolerable in that it offends generally
accepted standards of decency and morality, certainly a
situation “in which the recitation of the facts to an average
member of the community would arouse his resentment
against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’”

Id. at 811 (quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
cmt. d (1965)).
87

OF

TORTS § 46

Ammon v. Welty, 113 S.W.3d 185 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002).

334

Winter 2007

Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy

Vol 4:2

proposition that “[s]imply because a claim involves an animal
does not preclude a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress,”88 the court nevertheless found that such a claim was
not supported here where the required element of intent was not
met: there was no evidence that the defendant intended to inflict
harm on the family.89 The difference between the outcomes of
these two cases can be explained by the nature of the respective
defendants’ conduct: where the conduct of the defendants in
Burgess was found to be both intentional and outrageous, the
defendant’s conduct in Ammon did not meet either of these
required elements.90
Similar analysis was employed by the Third Circuit, holding
that under Pennsylvania law, the wrongful killing of a pet dog
could support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.91 The plaintiff’s pet Rottweiler, Immi, had escaped
from its yard and wandered into the next door alley.92 A police
officer, passing in his patrol car, stopped and confronted the
dog.93 Although the dog was not in any way aggressive toward
the officer, he reached for his gun.94 The plaintiff then saw what
was happening and shouted that the dog was hers and not to
shoot.95 After briefly hesitating, the officer proceeded to shoot

88

Id. at 188.

89

Id.

This distinction easily explains the difference in outcome between the
two cases. It is not the case, as one commentator suggested, simply that
courts are failing to be consistent in measuring damages for the death of pet
animals. See Green, supra note 3, at 166 (“modern courts actually are
moving further away from consensus on the companion animal valuation
question”), and id. at 166 n.9 (citing Burgess and Ammon as examples of
such lack of consensus).
90

91

Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2001).

92

Id. at 209.

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

Id.
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the dog five times, killing it.96 The plaintiff brought multiple
claims against the police officer and other defendants, including
a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.97 Despite
the defendant’s argument that “the killing of a pet under any
circumstances would not be recognized by Pennsylvania courts
as extreme or outrageous,”98 the court upheld the claim:
Given the strength of community sentiment
against at least extreme forms of animal abuse and
the substantial emotional investment that pet
owners frequently make in their pets, we would
not expect the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to
rule out all liability predicated on the killing of a
pet.99
The court distinguished several Pennsylvania cases that
found against such claims, on the grounds that these cases
involved either negligent behavior or behavior that was not
intended to inflict severe emotional distress on the animals’
owners.100 Here, in contrast, the court found that “a reasonable
trier of fact could conclude that Officer Eberly shot Immi either
intending to cause Kim Brown severe emotional distress or with
the knowledge that the infliction of such distress on her would
be virtually certain.”101
While Burgess, Ammon, and Muhlenberg make clear that a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress will not fail
simply because it involves a pet animal, it is less clear if the
courts would have been as likely to find the outrageous element
met in a case involving inanimate property rather than pet
horses and dogs. The Muhlenberg court’s language, particularly
its reference to the “substantial emotional investment that pet
96

Id.

97

Id. at 217.

98

Id. at 218.

99

Id.

100 Id. (discussing Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)
and Miller v. Peraino, 626 A.2d 637 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)).
101

Id. at 219.
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owners frequently make in their pets”102 suggests that animals
hold a special place. It is certainly possible, perhaps probable,
that the plaintiffs’ relationships with their animals played a
significant role in the courts’ findings that behavior which
resulted in the animals’ destruction or injury was outrageous. It
is also possible, however, to imagine similar findings when
defendants behave particularly egregiously in destroying
inanimate property – such as irreplaceable family photographs
– to which a plaintiff has a strong sentimental attachment.
Thus, while numerous courts have categorically denied
emotional distress damages for the killing of animals, the few
courts that have allowed such damages have generally done so
on theories that might apply to inanimate as well as animate
property.103

D. GOING BEYOND THE CHANGES SEEN IN THE COURTS
Despite the large number of cases where the plaintiffs have
challenged the general rule that only allows recovery for an
animal’s fair market value, few courts have diverged very far
from this standard. While many courts do appear sympathetic to
such claims, most also see their choices as being limited by
existing law, and few courts seem to see themselves in a position
to change that law. In some cases, intermediate appellate courts
have deferred to higher courts to make these changes in the
laws,104 while in others the courts defer to legislative bodies to
make such changes.105 Given the unwillingness of most courts to
make such changes, it is not surprising that we are beginning to
see legislative response in a number of states. It is also
102

Id. at 218.

103 See Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066, 1071
(Haw. 1981).

See Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. Schuster, 144 S.W.3d 554, 565 (Tex.
App. 2004).
104

105 See, e.g., Koester v. VCA Animal Hosp. 624 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2001) (holding that emotional distress damages are not available for
death of a dog because pets are personal property, but inviting plaintiff and
others to urge the Legislature to “visit this issue in light of public policy
considerations.”)
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unsurprising that many of the proposals set forth by
commentators who advocate continuing this trend seek to build
on these legislative responses.
1. Changes in Statutory Law
Tennessee was the first state to enact legislation increasing
the damages allowed for a lost or injured animal.106 Known as
the T-Bo Act of 2000, and named for the pet Shih Tzu of the
state legislator who proposed the bill,107 the Tennessee statute
allows recovery for non-economic damages for the loss of a pet,
including “reasonably expected society, companionship, love
and affection of the pet.”108 While going further than most
common law extensions by explicitly allowing the recovery of
non-economic damages, the Tennessee law contains a number
of limitations, including a damages limit of $5,000,109 and
exemptions for non-profit entities, government agencies, and
licensed veterinarians.110 It also limits its application to dogs
and cats;111 any other lost pet would not be covered by the
statute.
A 2004 Connecticut statute is even more limited.112 This
enactment limits its coverage to domesticated dogs and cats,113
106

See TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403 (2006).

107

See McEachern Nunalee & Weedon, supra note 6, at 144.

108

TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(d) (2006).

§ 44-17-403(a)(1). The original year 2000 non-economic damages cap
was raised from $4,000 to $5,000 in 2004. See 2004 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch.
957. Interestingly, this damage cap of $5000 in a statute that increases the
allowed categories of damages is considerably lower than the $7500 cap on
damages in a Maryland statute that was enacted to limit the damages for the
death or injury to a pet to compensatory damages. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS.
& JUD. PROC. § 11-110(a)(2) (West 2006).
109

110 TENN. CODE

ANN. § 44-17-403 (a) & (e).

111 § 44-17-403 (b) (“As used in this section, ‘pet’ means any domesticated
dog or cat normally maintained in or near the household of its owner.”).

See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-351a (West 2007) (“Liability for
intentionally killing or injuring companion animal”).
112
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only applies when a companion animal is intentionally,114 not
negligently, killed or injured, and does not expand recovery to
non-economic damages.115 The law does, however, expand the
range of economic damages that can be recovered: “including,
but not limited to, expenses of veterinary care, the fair monetary
value of the companion animal and burial expenses for the
companion animal.”116 Under this law, an owner whose animal
was intentionally injured would presumably be able to recover
the costs of treating such injuries, even if those costs were in
excess of the animal’s fair market value. This law also allows
courts to award punitive damages, but provides exemptions to
such awards similar to the exemptions set out in the Tennessee
statute.117
Illinois has chosen a somewhat different approach to
recognizing awards of non-economic damages, by including
such a provision for civil actions in its Humane Care for Animals

113 § 22-351a (a). The statute explicitly excludes any “dog or cat kept for
farming or biomedical research practices.” Id.

Id. § 22-351a (b). The law exempts persons who kill an animal “in
defense of such person or another person or as otherwise authorized by law.”
Id.
114

115

Id.

116

Id.

117

§ 22-351a (d):
The court shall not assess punitive damages and a
reasonable attorney’s fee pursuant to subsection (c) of this
section against: (1) A veterinarian licensed pursuant to
chapter 384 while following accepted standards of practice of
the profession, (2) the state or any political subdivision of the
state or any employee, officer or agent thereof while acting
within the scope of such employee’s, officer’s or agent’s
employment or official duties, or (3) an employee of or
volunteer for a nonprofit organization or nonprofit
corporation organized and operated exclusively for the
prevention of cruelty to animals or the protection of stray,
abandoned or mistreated animals while acting within the
scope of such employee’s or volunteer’s employment or
duties.
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Act, the state anti-cruelty statute.118 Section 16.3 of the Act
allows an animal’s owner to bring a civil action against someone
who kills or injures her animal, but only where the defendant
commits aggravated cruelty119 or torture120 as defined by the Act,
or if the defendant kills an animal while acting in bad faith
under the Act’s sections 3.06 (dealing with the disposition of
seized companion animals and animals used for fighting
purposes)121 or section 12 (impounding animals).122 As long as
these conditions are met, however, the statute allows a broad
range of damages:
Damages may include, but are not limited to, the
monetary value of the animal, veterinary expenses
incurred on behalf of the animal, any other
expenses incurred by the owner in rectifying the
effects of the cruelty, pain, and suffering of the
animal, and emotional distress suffered by the
owner. In addition to damages that may be
proven, the owner is also entitled to punitive or
exemplary damages of not less than $500 but not
more than $25,000 for each act of abuse or neglect
to which the animal was subjected. In addition,
the court must award reasonable attorney’s fees

118 Humane Care for Animals Act, 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/1 et. seq.
(West 2007).

510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/16-3 (West 2007). The Act defines
aggravated cruelty as “intentionally commit[ting] an act that causes a
companion animal to suffer serious injury or death.” 510 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 70/3-02 (West 2007).
119

120 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/16-3 (West 2007). Torture is committed
“when that person without legal justification knowingly or intentionally
tortures an animal. For purposes of this Section, and subject to subsection
(b), ‘torture’ means infliction of or subjection to extreme physical pain,
motivated by an intent to increase or prolong the pain, suffering, or agony of
the animal.” 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/3-03(a) (West 2007).
121 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/16-3 (West 2007); 510 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 70/3-06 (West 2007).

510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/16-3 (West 2007);.510 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 70/12 (West 2007).
122
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and costs actually incurred by the owner in the
prosecution of any action under this Section.123
Illinois thus takes a very expansive stance on the types of
damages that can be awarded in a civil action, including even
damages for the owner’s emotional distress.
It places
limitations, however, on the situations where such damages are
available, by requiring not just intentional behavior but bad
faith, torture, and aggravated cruelty.
2. Proposals for Change Set Forth by Commentators
Several of the commentators who have criticized the current
approach to the valuation of animals have set forth proposals
that build on these legislative models. Waisman and Newell,
who criticize the Tennessee statute as “extremely limited in
scope, probably due to political exigencies in that particular
state,”124 propose legislation that would be much more
comprehensive in compensating for the injury or loss of a
companion animal:
[D]amages shall be recoverable for the human
companion’s mental anguish, emotional distress,
and other non-economic injuries, including the
loss of society, companionship, comfort,
protection and services; for veterinary and other
special care required; for reasonable burial
expenses; for court costs and attorney’s fees, and
other reasonable damages resulting from the
willful, wanton, reckless or negligent act or
omission.125
Another commentator, Margit Livingston, proposes
compensating owners for the loss of intangible elements of the
human-animal relationship, including “loss of companionship of
the animal for a reasonable replacement period,” and
compensation for the “mental anguish experienced by plaintiffs
123

510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/16-3 (West 2007).

124

Waisman & Newell, supra note 40, at 70.

125 Id. at 72. The proposal also includes punitive damages when willful,
wanton, or reckless conduct causes the death or injury of an animal
companion. Id.
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upon the untimely death of their companion animal.”126 Yet
another proposal builds on approaches taken by the few courts
that have been willing to extend damages beyond market value,
proposing that courts use a “value to owner” standard, including
a loss of companionship component, and advocating for the
award of punitive damages “where the conduct of the defendant
is particularly heinous.”127 Byszewski presents an interesting
proposal that builds on an idea first adopted by a court in a
wrongful death suit for a negligently killed child.128 Applying
the court’s “loss of investment” approach to negligently killed
animals, she proposes that courts use the expected cost of care
over the animal’s life expectancy had it not been killed to
estimate the animal’s true value to its owner or guardian,
including its companionship value.129
All of these proposals, and to a lesser extent the statutes,130
take a different approach from the judicial decisions that have
allowed for valuation above an animal’s market value. Unlike
the case law, these proposals look to change the law by
recognizing that the legal status of animals should be different
from that of inanimate property, and that the calculation of
damages awards should reflect that difference.

126

Livingston, supra note 40, at 844.

127

Epstein, supra note 40, at 46-48.

128

Byszewski, supra note 40, at 233-36.

129

Id. at 235.

130 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(d) (2006): by including damages
for the “reasonably expected society, companionship, love and affection for
the pet,” the Tennessee statute seems to recognize that humans can form
such meaningful relationships with their companion animals, which is not
the type of recognition one would expect for “relationships” with inanimate
property. . On the other hand, by explicitly using the term “owner” (“‘pet’
means any domesticated dog or cat normally maintained in or near the
household of its owner.” § 44-17-403(b)), the statute appears to implicitly
recognize the status of pets as property.
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PART III: RECOGNIZING A CHANGE IN THE
LEGAL STATUS OF COMPANION ANIMALS
Most of the courts that have allowed damage awards above
an animal’s fair market value do not, ultimately, say anything
regarding changing the legal status of animals to something
other than property. Rather, these courts merely seem to be
looking at different ways of valuing this form of property.131 In a
few cases, however, courts have actually been willing to
entertain the idea that animals are in a different legal category
from inanimate property. One of the ways we see this
recognition is in the language that courts use in deciding cases
involving the loss or injury of companion animals. In some
cases, this language may actually affect outcome of the court’s
opinion. In others, however, the language is merely dicta, and
effects no changes in the law.

A. CHANGES EVIDENCED BY LANGUAGE USED BY COURTS
Language from Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc.,132
a case decided by the Queens County Civil Court in New York,
has been cited numerous times by courts, commentators, and
advocates.133 In awarding emotional distress damages when the
body of the plaintiff’s fifteen-year-old poodle was mishandled
after its death, the court created a special legal status for
companion animals:
[T]he court must first decide whether a pet such as
a dog is only an item of personal property as prior
cases have held. This court now overrules prior
precedent and holds that a pet is not just a thing
131 The only possible exception is the Brousseau case, where, by including
loss of companionship as an element of damages, the New York court seemed
to be saying something about the animal’s status that put it in a different
category from inanimate property. Brousseau v. Rosenthal, 443 N.Y.S.2d
285 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980).
132

415 N.Y.S.2d 182 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979).

133 A Westlaw Key Cite search of Corso yields eighty citing references,
including several cases in New York and other jurisdictions, numerous
secondary sources, and a half dozen trial and appellate petitions, motions,
briefs, etc. (last search Feb. 18, 2007).
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but occupies a special place somewhere in between
a person and a piece of personal property.134
The court thus awarded damages for the plaintiff’s mental
anguish above the market value of the dog. In doing so, it made
a special point to narrow its decision to the loss of animals,
specifically distinguishing the loss of inanimate property:
This decision is not to be construed to
include an award for the loss of a family heirloom
which would also cause great mental anguish. An
heirloom while it might be the source of good
feelings is merely an inanimate object and is not
capable of returning love and affection. It does not
respond to human stimulation; it has no brain
capable of displaying emotion which in turn causes
a human response.
Losing the right to
memorialize a pet rock, or a pet tree or losing a
family picture album is not actionable. But a
dog — that is something else. To say it is a piece of
personal property and no more is a repudiation of
our humaneness. This I cannot accept.135
Despite this case’s strong language, clear message, the effect
of that message on the outcome of the case, and all the other
courts and commentators who have cited it, Corso actually has
very little precedential value. Its holding has not been followed
by subsequent New York cases. Several recent cases have simply
ignored the Corso “holding” and have instead asserted that New
York law recognizes pets as personal property,136 and because
pets are personal property, plaintiffs cannot recover emotional
distress damages for their loss.137 Additionally, a federal court,
134 Corso, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 183 (citation omitted). This is the precise
language that has often been cited by other courts.
135

Id.

136

See Lewis v. Di Donna, 743 N.Y.S.2d 186 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).

Mercurio v. Weber, No. SC1113/03, 2003 WL 21497325 (N.Y. Dist. Ct.
2003). This case further repudiates the Corso holding by finding that, “[i]f
plaintiff could recover for the emotional distress of losing her dog, such logic
could be extended to allow recovery for emotional distress caused by the
destruction of other sentimental items like family heirlooms, class rings or
old pictures.” Id. at *1. See also Jason v. Parks, 638 N.Y.S.2d 170, 171 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996) (“It is well established that a pet owner in New York cannot
137
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deciding a case under New York law, described Corso’s holding
that a pet was more than property as an “aberration[] flying in
the face of overwhelming authority to the contrary.”138 The
federal district court criticized the Corso opinion for providing
“no legal reasoning why prior precedent should be overruled in
categorizing pets as more than property.”139 Thus the Corso
language, despite its appeal to many, essentially sits on the
books as a lower court opinion with little actual clout.
Similarly strong language can be seen in a Wisconsin case,
where the plaintiff sought damages for emotional distress when
a police officer fatally shot her dog:
At the outset, we note that we are
uncomfortable with the law’s cold characterization
of a dog . . . as mere “property.” Labeling a dog
“property” fails to describe the value human
beings place upon the companionship that they
enjoy with a dog. A companion dog is not a
fungible item, equivalent to other items of
personal property. A companion dog is not a
living room sofa or dining room furniture. This
term inadequately and inaccurately describes the
relationship between a human and a dog.140
While this language has also been cited and quoted by other
courts and commentators,141 it remains dicta. The Wisconsin
recover damages for the negligent destruction of a dog.”); Johnson v.
Douglas, 723 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001) (“[T]he court is not
about to recognize a tortious cause of action to recover for emotional distress
due to the death of a family pet”).
138

1994).
139

Gluckman v. American Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151, 158 (S.D.N.Y.
Id.

Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Wis. 2001)
(footnotes omitted).
140

141

2001).

See, e.g., Harabes v. The Barkery, Inc., 791 A.2d 1142 (N.J. Super. Ct.
As recognized by the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
“[l]abeling a dog ‘property’ fails to describe the value human
beings place upon the companionship that they enjoy with a
dog . . . A companion dog is not a living room sofa or dining
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court’s language in this case had no effect on the outcome of the
case. Despite the concern the Wisconsin Supreme Court
expressed with the above language, it did not see itself in a
position to change “established legal doctrine” and thus refused
to award emotional distress damages for loss of a dog.142
Judge Andell’s concurring opinion in a Texas Court of
Appeals case concerning damages for a hunter’s negligent killing
of the plaintiff’s dogs expresses a similar sentiment:
Society has long since moved beyond the
untenable Cartesian view that animals are
unfeeling automatons and, hence, mere property.
The law should reflect society’s recognition that
animals are sentient and emotive beings that are
capable of providing companionship to the
humans with whom they live. . . .
Losing a beloved pet is not the same as losing an
inanimate object, however cherished it may be.
room furniture. This term inadequately and inaccurately
describes the relationship between a human and a dog.”
Nevertheless, there is no authority in this state for allowing
plaintiffs to recover non-economic damages resulting from
defendants’ alleged negligence.
Id. at 1146 (citation omitted).
142 Rabideau, 627 N.W.2d at 798. A very similar result, as well as very
similar language can found in a 2004 Connecticut case, where the appellate
court found that a plaintiff whose dog was removed and euthanized by
animal control officers had failed to state a claim because the common law
did not recognize emotional distress claims for “injury to such property as a
pet.” Myers v. City of Hartford, 853 A.2d 621, 625 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).
That court’s language sounds very much like that in the Rabideau case:

Labeling a pet as property fails to describe the emotional value
human beings place on the companionship that they enjoy with such
an animal. Although dogs are considered property; see [CONN. GEN.
STAT.] [Section] 22-350; this term inadequately and inaccurately
describes the relationship between an individual and his or her pet.
That having been said, there is no common-law authority in this state
that allows plaintiffs to recover noneconomic damages resulting from
a defendant’s alleged negligent or intentional act resulting in the
death of a pet . . . .
Myers, 853 A.2d at 626.
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Even an heirloom of great sentimental value, if
lost, does not constitute a loss comparable to that
of a living being.143
Andell chose to write separately from the majority in order
“to address what I consider to be a more substantial basis for
affirming this award, namely, the intrinsic or special value of
domestic animals as companions and beloved pets.”144
All three of these cases express, in strong language,
important and meaningful differences between animals and
inanimate property. Yet they represent little, if any, actual
changes in the law. One is a lower court opinion that has not
been followed, even in its own jurisdiction, another is mere
dicta, and the third is language in a concurrence. But despite
the minimal precedential weight of these cases, the language
used in these opinions reflects, at a minimum, an increasing
discomfort that some judges have had with the legal status quo
– it is clear that this is an area where the established law is in
conflict with the reality of how many people view companion
animals.145

B. COURT DECISIONS AND LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS THAT
RECOGNIZE A CHANGE IN THE LEGAL STATUS OF
COMPANION ANIMALS
If valuation of damages for lost or injured animals were the
only legal area affected, it might be less important to change an
animal’s status. But courts are also called upon to resolve
disputes between losers and finders of pet animals, resolve other
animal custody disputes, and deal with provisions of wills that
request that the animals be destroyed upon the owner’s death.
And state legislatures are acting in ways that recognize a change
in the status of animals by creating legislation that allows for
enforceable trusts to ensure the animals’ care after the owner
Bueckner v. Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368, 377-78 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994)
(Andell, J. concurring).
143

144

Id. at 373.

145 See infra notes 276-281 and accompanying text, discussing the
numerous ways in which behavior towards pets demonstrates the extent to
which our society has come to value companion animals.
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dies and by increasing penalties under their animal cruelty
statutes.
1. Lost & Found Animal Disputes
Many lost animals end up at local shelters. Shelters have
special roles in caring for lost animals and finding new homes
for them. As a result, specific laws have developed regulating
shelters. State statutes regulate how long a shelter must keep a
found animal before adopting it out to another family;146
whether there needs to be any holding period at all when an
owner surrenders an animal to a shelter; and what efforts, if
any, the shelter must make to find the animal’s original
owner.147
If the shelter complies with the statutory
requirements, courts do not interfere with their decision to
adopt out an animal.148 Courts have also declined to require
shelters to disclose the identity of the animal’s new owner when
the original owner requests this information from the shelter
that adopted the animal out.149
But disputes sometimes develop when someone loses a
companion animal and a private person takes in that animal –
bypassing the shelter system and the laws that apply in that
In addition to the shelter holding periods mandated by state statutes,
the Federal Pet Theft Act (a part of the Animal Welfare Act) requires that
shelters hold pets for at least five days before selling them to a dealer, a
provision that was enacted to minimize the risks of stolen pets being sold for
research. See 7 U.S.C. § 2158 (a)(1) (2007).
146

See generally PATRICIA A. BOLEN, ANIMAL LEGAL & HISTORICAL
CENTER, LOST AND FOUND: HUMANE SOCIETIES’ RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS REGARDING COMPANION ANIMAL OWNERSHIP (2005),
http://www.animallaw.info/articles/dduspetadoption.htm (last visited Feb.
12, 2007).
147

148 Id.
See also Rebecca J. Huss, Separation, Custody, and Estate
Planning Issues Relating to Companion Animals, 74 U. COLO. L. REV 181, 216
(2003) [hereinafter Huss, Separation, Custody, and Estate Planning] (“The
clear trend among appellate cases is that once an adoption has been made
through a recognized humane society, especially if the society followed the
standards set forth under relevant law, the adoption will be upheld.”).
149 See John J. Tiemessen & Jason A. Weiner, Commentary, The Golden
Retriever Rule: Alaska’s Identity Privilege for Animal Adoption Agencies
and for Adoptive Animal Owners, 21 ALASKA L. REV. 77, 77-78 (2004).
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context. One such case was Morgan v. Kroupa, where the
Vermont Supreme court recognized that a pet dog’s status is
different from that of property.150 In July 1994, Mary Morgan
found a dog that had been lost by Zane Kroupa.151 Morgan made
several efforts to locate the dog’s owner: reporting to the local
humane society, posting notices in area parks and stores, and
arranging for announcements on a local radio station.152 When
these efforts to locate the dog’s owner failed, she took the dog in,
took care of it, and “considered it the household pet.”153 More
than a year later, Kroupa, who lived two miles from Morgan,
discovered where the dog was and sought to have it returned.154
He drove to Morgan’s house and left with the dog. 155 Morgan
brought an action to recover the dog.156
In affirming the trial court’s decision to award possession of
dog to Morgan, the Vermont Supreme Court declined to apply
Vermont’s lost property statute, despite language in the statute
covering “stray beasts.”157 The court determined that this
language was not intended to apply to lost pets, but rather
150

702 A.2d 630 (Vt. 1997).

151

Id. at 631.

152

Id.

153

Id.

154

Id.

155

Id.

156

Id.

157

Id. at 632. The court noted:
Vermont’s lost property statute provides that a person
who finds money or goods, to the value of $3.00 or more, or
takes up a stray beast, the owner of which is not known,
shall, within six days thereafter, make two notices,
describing such money, goods or beast, with the natural or
artificial marks, with the time and place of finding or taking
up the same, and post them in two public places in town in
which such property was found.

Id. (citing 27 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1101).
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“agricultural animals of substantial monetary value.”158 The
court declined to apply the lost property statute to a lost pet
because, “pets generally do not fit neatly within traditional
property law principles.”159 In reaching its decision, the court’s
language recognized that pets belong in a different category
from other forms of property: “Like most pets, [the dog’s] worth
is not primarily financial, but emotional; its value derives from
the animal’s relationship with its human companions.”160
Instead of applying the lost property statute to this dispute,
the court decided to fashion new rules that would recognize “the
substantial value that society places on domestic animals.”161
The court further determined that it would be against the public
interest not to provide incentives for finders of lost animals to
take in, care for and develop relationships with them.162 The
result in this case was that Morgan, who found the dog and
cared for it for over a year, was awarded possession of the
dog.163
An interesting aspect to this case was the approach taken by
the trial court. While the lower court opted to treat the case as a
simple property case and apply Vermont’s lost property statute
(a result that was ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court), it
acknowledged that the case might be approached under a
number of other legal theories, including weighing the
“emotional attachment” of the two parties, and notably,
“inquiring into what was in the ‘best interests’ of the dog,”
similar to the approach taken in child custody cases.164 While
158

Id.

159 Id. at 633. The court went on to cite language from Corso v. Crawford
Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979): “[A] pet is
not just a thing but occupies a special place somewhere in between a person
and a piece of personal property.”
160

Morgan, 702 A.2d at 633.

161

Id.

162

Id.

163

Id.

164

Id. at 631.
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neither the trial court nor the appellate court opted to take this
last approach, both courts at least entertained the possibility.
While the Morgan court’s approach clearly places
companion animals in a different category from other property
(including, notably, other animal property), this approach is not
one that has yet been embraced by other courts, either in
process or in result.165 Nevertheless, the case provides an
important example of how traditional property concepts provide
an inadequate framework for decisions involving the custody of
lost and found pets. The case is also a useful jumping-off point
for proposals on how such disputes might be addressed in the
future. One commentator, for example, has proposed that a
balancing test be used to the weigh interests of the pet’s original
owners with those of the person who found the pet and
subsequently bonded with it.166
2. Pet Custody Cases
Several courts have, in fact, applied a “best interest”
standard in resolving custody disputes over companion animals.
And while this approach appears to represent a minority
position167 at this time, it indicates another important inroad
into the legal system’s view of companion animals as something
distinct from inanimate property.168 In one New York case, for
example, the court used the best interest standard of child
custody cases to determine that it was in the best interests of an
elderly cat to remain at the home where he has “lived,
See, e.g., Williams v. McMahan, No. 26983-0-II, 2002 WL 242538
(Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2002) (applying property principles, the trial court
ordered a dog returned to its original owner after the person who found the
dog had kept and cared for the dog for nine months).
165

166 See Huss, Separation, Custody, and Estate Planning, supra note 148,
at 218-19.

See id. at 221 (“Usually, animals are treated in property settlements as
just another form of personal property and assigned a monetary value.”). See
also id. at 225, discussing Nuzzaci v. Nuzzaci, No. CN194-10771, 1995 WL
783006 (Del. Fam. Ct. Apr. 19, 1995), where a Delaware court “declined to
apply the best interests of the animal approach.”
167

See Barbara Newell, Animal Custody Disputes: A Growing Crack in
the ‘Legal Thinghood’ of Nonhuman Animals, 6 ANIMAL L. 179 (2000).
168
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prospered, loved and been loved for the past four years.”169 In
another, there was a dispute over a cat’s legal custody after two
unrelated roommates separated.170 In awarding custody to one
of the roommates, the judge took into account what was in the
best interest of the cat.171
The cases using a “best interest” standard to determine pet
custody have generated a fair bit of coverage in the popular
media,172 not all of it positive, but the idea is becoming more and
more mainstream. One legal commentator, for example, has
recently proposed the development of statutory provisions to
determine pet custody using a “best interests of the animal”
approach and modeling the provisions on child custody
statutes.173 Such an approach makes good sense given the ways
in which many human families regard their pets as part of the
family and how most people regard their pets in ways very
different from the way they regard their inanimate property.
169

Raymond v. Lachmann, 695 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).

170 See Brooke A. Masters, In Courtroom Tug of War Over Custody,
Roommate Wins the Kitty, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 1997, at B1 (describing
Arlington, Virginia’s Judge Kendrick’s resolution of the struggle between
Andrew Zovko and Kovar Gregory over the possession of their cat, Grady).

See Newell, supra note 168, at 180 (“According to the Washington
Post, ‘for [Judge] Kendrick, Grady’s happiness took priority . . . . Kendrick
said he would decide ‘what is in the best interest of Grady . . . .’” (quoting
Masters, supra note 170).
171

172 See, e.g., Angelica Martinez, Kitty Custody – What Happens to Pets
When Owners Separate, CAT FANCY, Apr. 2004, at 34. This article explains
that because people are treating their companion animals like family
members, and often like children, pet custody battles are becoming more
prevalent in divorce cases. Id. at 34, 36. To decide these cases, some courts
are using the best interest standard to decide which person should receive
custody, much like they do in child custody cases. Id. at 36. Additionally,
some courts are now taking into account the care of the animal, such as by
looking into which individual actually cared for the pet. Id. at 36-37. In some
cases, parties are using experts, pet therapists, and specialist to make these
arguments. Couples have been granted joint custody, and the court can
award visitation rights and financial support – a process which has been
dubbed, “petimony.” Id. at 36.

See Huss, Separation, Custody, and Estate Planning, supra note 148,
at 227-29.
173
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3. Estates and Trusts
Estate Planning and Administration is another area of law
that demonstrates important differences in the ways both courts
and legislatures are treating animate versus inanimate property.
There are a number of examples of judicial decisions where
clauses in wills that instruct that pets be destroyed are voided as
“against public policy.” A more recent, and perhaps much more
far-reaching development is the adoption of legislation in a
number of jurisdictions that allows for the creation of binding
pet trusts that are set up to insure that a companion animal is
well cared for after its owner’s death.
a. Judicial Decisions Voiding Clauses Instructing That
Animals Be Destroyed
The Estate of Howard Brand is a frequently cited example of
a court’s willingness to void a testamentary clause calling for the
destruction of animals.174 Perhaps this case is so often cited
because it so well exemplifies the difference between animals
and inanimate property, both in the public reaction to clauses
calling for destruction and in the legal remedies that courts are
willing to fashion. Brand’s will included a provision that, upon
his death, his Cadillac be crushed and his horses be destroyed.175
When the provisions of his will became known there was very
little concern expressed about crushing the car, but a great deal
of public outcry about the fate of horses.176 A neighbor of
Abigail J. Sykas, Note, Waste Not, Want Not: Can the Public Policy
Doctrine Prohibit the Destruction of Property by Testamentary Direction?,
25 VT. L. REV. 911, 934 (2001) (citing In re Brand’s Estate, No. 28473 (Vt.
Chittenden Cty. Prob. Ct. Mar. 17, 1999)).
174

Id. “The court acknowledged the fact that Mr. Brand was attempting
to thwart any possibility that the animals would be mistreated after his
death.” Id. at 934 n.217.
175

176 “[W]hile the court received more than fifty letters regarding the
outcome of this case, none of them addressed the destruction of a perfectly
good Cadillac.” SUZETTE DANIELS, ANIMAL LEGAL & HISTORICAL CENTER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO PET IN WILLS AND PET EUTHANASIA (2004), available
at http://www.animallaw.info/articles/arusdanielssuzette2004.htm (last
visited Feb. 12, 2007) (citing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order,
In re Estate of Howard H. Brand, (Mar. 17, 1999), available
at http://www.animallaw.info/pleadings/pb_pdf/pbusvtbrandorder.pdf (last
visited Feb. 12, 2007)).
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Brand’s sought a way to contest his will, and the story was
reported in a local newspaper, which eventually led to the
formation of “The Coalition to Save Brand’s Horses.”177 The
group, which included organizations such as the Vermont
Humane Federation and the Student Animal Legal Defense
Fund of the Vermont Law School, filed a motion for Preliminary
Injunction and a Motion to Intervene.178 Numerous people
contacted the coalition offering to adopt the horses if their lives
were spared.179
While Brand’s attorney argued that the will provision was
legal, represented his client’s final wishes, and should therefore
be upheld,180 the court sided with the coalition and refused to
allow the horses to be killed.181 Instead, it voided the provision
stipulating their destruction as against public policy.182 While
acknowledging that the testator’s intentions were to prevent the
animals from suffering after his death by having them humanely
euthanized, the court applied the doctrine of cy pres, and found
that the horses could better be saved from inhumane treatment
by saving their lives and letting them be taken in by someone
else willing to care for them.183
Similar results were seen in several other American cases
and one Canadian case.
In In re Capers Estate,184 a
177 See Daniels, supra note 1766 (citing Pamela Loring, Horses Await
Brand New Life after Rescue From a Willed Death, HORSIN’ AROUND (1999)).
178

Id.

179

Id.

180 See Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, In re Estate of Howard H. Brand, (Mar. 4, 1999), available at
http://www.animallaw.info/pleadings/pb_pdf/pbusvtbrandmemoopp.pdf
(last visited Feb. 12, 2007).

See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, In re.
Estate of Howard H. Brand (Mar. 17, 1999), available at
http://www.animallaw.info/pleadings/pb_pdf/pbusvtbrandorder.pdf (last
visited Feb. 12, 2007). See also Sykas, supra note 174, at 934.
181

182

Sykas, supra note 174, at 934.

183

See id.

184

34 Pa. D. & C.2d 121 (Pa. Orphans’ Ct., Allegheny County 1964).
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Pennsylvania court found that a will instruction to destroy two
Irish Setters185 was void “as not being within the purview of the
Wills Act of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania” and also as
being against the public policy of the Commonwealth.186
Instead of following the testator’s instructions that the animals
be killed, the court gave the dogs to the couple who had been
caring for them since her death.187 A California court similarly
voided a testator’s instruction, through a provision in her will to
destroy her pet dog, Sido.188 The court found that the provision
violated public policy and was potentially illegal under
California law (because of specific provisions authorizing
conditions under which dogs may be euthanized).189 The court
fashioned a remedy where the dog passed under the will’s
residuary clause to an organization called Pets Unlimited, which
allowed Sido to stay in its custodial home, subject to inspection
by the court.190
A Canadian court voided a similar clause in the will of Clive
Wishart, who directed that after his death his four horses,
Barney, Bill, Jack, and King, be “shot by the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police and then buried.”191 The Royal Canadian
185 Id. A clause in Ida Capers’ will instructed: “I direct that any dog which
I may own at the time of my death be destroyed in a humane manner and I
give and grant unto my Executors hereinafter named full and complete power
and discretion necessary to carry out the same.” Id. at 122.

Id. at 141; see also Harold W. Hannah, Wills Requiring the
Destruction of Pets—the Veterinarian’s Position, 199 J. AM. VETERINARY
MED. ASS’N 1156, 1158 (1991).
186

187

In re Capers’ Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d at 141.

188 See Sykas, supra note 174, at 932 (citing Rep. Tr. at 6, Smith v.
Avanzino, No. 225-698 (Cal. Super. Ct., S.F. City & County, June 17, 1980)).
189

Id.

Id. The court made its decision despite being notified that the issue
was moot because of legislative action. “California S. Bill 2059, which
included a provision to save Sido specifically, had been unanimously passed
and signed into law before the close of court proceedings.” Waisman &
Newell, supra note 40, at 57 n.52.
190

191

In re Wishart, 129 N.B.R.2d 397 at ¶ 2 (1992).
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Mounted Police refused to carry out this instruction without a
court order, and the court ultimately declined to give such an
order.192 Like the Brand case, there was a great deal of public
outcry against the destruction of the horses, both in the United
States and Canada.193 In refusing to carry out Wishart’s
instructions, the court found the provision to be void as contrary
to public policy.194 It also found that the testator’s wishes, which
it determined to be preventing the mistreatment of the horses
after his death, could better be effected by directing the New
Brunswick Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
(S.P.C.A). to find a new home for the horses.195
This last point highlights some of the potential difficulties
with cases where courts find clauses directing animals’
destruction upon the testator’s death void as against public
policy. If the court truly is aiming to find a better way to effect
the testator’s intent that the animals not suffer after his death, it
is not clear how far courts are actually willing to go to see that
the animals are in fact properly cared for – for the remainder of
their lives.196 In its efforts to address these concerns, the
192

Id. at ¶ 3, 23. See also Daniels, supra note 176.

See Wishart, 129 N.B.R.2d at ¶ 5 (discussing the public reaction to the
clause of the will); Daniels, supra note 176.
193

“It is my conclusion that to destroy Barney, Bill, Jack and King as
directed in the will at this time and in the present circumstances would be
contrary to public policy. The direction in the will is therefore void.”
Wishart, 129 N.B.R.2d at ¶ 23.
194

195

See Wishart, 129 N.B.R.2d at ¶ 18.

This was a point that arose with some emphasis in a discussion of
these cases with a group of veterinarians at Intern-Resident Rounds at the
University of Pennsylvania Veterinary School on May 17, 2005, at which this
author was present. A number of the veterinarians present expressed
concern at the courts’ intervention and argued that courts should only
prevent such killings if they are prepared to insure the animals’ proper care
for the rest of their lives. A similar sentiment can be seen in the opposition of
the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) to the American Horse
Slaughter Prevention Act (AHSPA), a proposed federal bill that would
prohibit the selling of horses for slaughter. While one might expect the
AVMA to support such a bill, they explain their opposition in the following
way: “The AVMA and AAEP recognize that the processing of unwanted
horses is currently a necessary aspect of the equine industry, and
provides a humane alternative to allowing the horse to continue a
196
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Canadian court set out the following conditions for the
disposition of the horses:
(1) Prior inspection and approval by the New
Brunswick S.P.C.A.;
(2) A written agreement between the Estate and
the New Brunswick S.P.C.A. and the new owner or
owners that he, she or it will cooperate with the
New
Brunswick
S.P.C.A.
after
acquiring
ownership, which agreement will include:
(a) Permission for regular inspection of the horses
...;
(b) An undertaking to provide and pay for
veterinary services . . . ;
(c) An undertaking to properly feed and care for
the horse or horses in accord with accepted
practices and not to abuse the horse or horses;
(d) Such other reasonable conditions as the parties
may agree upon and the Court approve to ensure
that the horses are not abused . . . .197
By setting out these conditions, the Wishart court recognized
that in order to properly carry out the testator’s intent, the
horses must be taken care of properly for the remainder of their
lives. It is not clear, however, to what extent the Brand court
took the rest of the horses’ lives into account in deciding who
life of discomfort and pain, and possibly inadequate care or
abandonment.” American Veterinary Medical Ass’n, AVMA Legislative Alerts
and Updates, American Horse Slaughter and Prevention Act,
http://www.capwiz.com/avma/issues/alert/?alertid=7130716&type=CO (no
longer available online; on file with author). The organization further states
that it will not support the legislation unless it adequately addresses the issue
of animal welfare:
The AHSPA does not address the welfare of horses that
will not be slaughtered. Many of these unwanted horses will
be donated to horse rescue and retirement facilities, which
are not regulated by any governmental body. While many of
these facilities are well run, regulations must be put in place
to establish standards of care to ensure the humane care of
these unwanted horses.
Id.
197

Wishart, 129 N.B.R.2d at ¶ 30.
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would care for them after it voided the testator’s instruction to
have them humanely euthanized. No such concerns arise, of
course, in the disposition of inanimate property upon a
testator’s death, further highlighting distinctions between these
different types of “property.”
If the courts in these cases were right, and the testators’ true
intent was to prevent mistreatment of their animals, then
testators (and, arguably, their animals) are better served if they
can make these choices directly. For many years, there was no
way to enforce a will provision to assure that an animal was
properly cared for after its owner’s death. In recent years,
however, a better way of assuring an animal’s care after its
owner’s death has come about, a legislative solution that allows
for the creation of binding trusts to insure an animal’s proper
care.
b. Legislation Creating Binding Pet Trusts
For many years, people who wished to provide for their
animals after their death had no way of insuring that such
provisions would be carried out. Property could not be left
directly to an animal, and attempts to create trusts to benefit an
animal could not be guaranteed success. In an historical section
of his 2000 article, Pet Animals: What Happens When Their
Owners Die, Gerry Beyer sets out the numerous ways “courts
have frustrated an owner’s intent to provide long-term care for
the pet after the owner’s death.”198 These include findings that
gifts to care for specific animals were not charitable, and were
therefore unenforceable;199 finding that such gifts violated the
rule against perpetuities (because an animal’s life could not
count as the “measuring life” to satisfy the Rule’s requirement
that the gift vest no later than twenty-one years after the death
of a measuring life);200 finding the amount of money left to care
for the animals to be excessive and therefore reducing those

198 Gerry W. Beyer, Pet Animals: What Happens When Their Owners
Die, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV 617, 629 (2000).
199

Id. at 631.

200

Id. at 631-32.
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amounts;201 and finding that a testator failed to select a proper
legal mechanism to transfer the funds for the animal’s care.202
The testators’ wishes to care for their pets had a better
chance of being realized once courts began recognizing and
permitting honorary trusts to provide for pets.203 However,
because these trusts were honorary, and therefore not
enforceable, there was no way of guaranteeing that their
provisions would actually be carried out. “Since these trustees
were permitted to exercise an enormous amount of discretion,
the recipient pets were completely at their mercy. The courts
did not step in to enforce the provisions and ensure that trustee
was properly caring for the animals.”204
Recent statutory changes have removed this uncertainty in
many jurisdictions. While a few pet-trust statutes still only
recognize honorary trusts for the care of pets,205 many other
state laws recognize enforceable pet trusts. Such recognition
initially came with the adoption of Section 2-907 of the Uniform
Probate Code (UPC), which provides for the enforcement of a
201

Id. at 633.

202

Id. at 633-34.

See id. at 635-39 (discussing the creative ways in which courts have
upheld honorary pet trusts and have construed them so they would not be in
violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities).
203

204

Daniels, supra note 176.

205 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 15212 (West 2007) (“A trust for the care of a
designated domestic or pet animal may be performed by the trustee for the life
of the animal, whether or not there is a beneficiary who can seek enforcement or
termination of the trust and whether or not the terms of the trust contemplate a
longer duration.”); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 701.11 (1) (West 2007) (“where the owner of
property makes a testamentary transfer in trust for a specific noncharitable
purpose, and there is no definite or definitely ascertainable human beneficiary
designated, no enforceable trust is created; but the transferee has power to
apply the property to the designated purpose, unless the purpose is
capricious.”). But see discussion at Estate Planning for Pets Foundation, Legal
Primer: The Law of Trusts for the Care of Pets (Oct. 1, 2004),
http://www.estateplanningforpets.org/ (this version is no longer available
online; on file with author): “However, the current trend in recent state laws has
veered away from this approach, as two states (Missouri and Tennessee) that
had originally enacted honorary trust statutes have recently enacted versions of
the UTC §408.” Id.
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pet trust by “an individual designated for that purpose in the
trust instrument or, if none, by an individual appointed by a
court upon application to it by an individual.”206 In adding this
206 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(c)(4) (2001). The National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws initially promulgated the UPC in
1969 and last amended Section 2-907 in 1993. Other relevant portions of
Section 2-907 read as follows:

(b) [Trust for Pets.] Subject to this subsection and
subsection (c), a trust for the care of a designated domestic
or pet animal is valid. The trust terminates when no living
animal is covered by the trust. A governing instrument must
be liberally construed to bring the transfer within this
subsection, to presume against the merely precatory or
honorary nature of the disposition, and to carry out the
general intent of the transferor. Extrinsic evidence is
admissible in determining the transferor’s intent.
(c) [Additional Provisions Applicable to Honorary Trusts
and Trusts for Pets.] In addition to the provisions of
subsection (a) or (b), a trust covered by either of those
subsections is subject to the following provisions:
(1) Except as expressly provided otherwise in the trust
instrument, no portion of the principal or income may be
converted to the use of the trustee or to any use other than
for the trust’s purposes or for the benefit of a covered animal.
(2) Upon termination, the trustee shall transfer the
unexpended trust property in the following order:
(i) as directed in the trust instrument;
(ii) if the trust was created in a nonresiduary clause in
the transferor’s will or in a codicil to the transferor’s will,
under the residuary clause in the transferor’s will; and
(iii) if no taker is produced by the application of
subparagraph (i) or (ii), to the transferor’s heirs under
Section 2-711.
(3) For the purposes of Section 2-707, the residuary
clause is treated as creating a future interest under the terms
of a trust.
(4) The intended use of the principal or income can be
enforced by an individual designated for that purpose in the
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section, the drafters recognized the “concern of many pet
owners by providing them a means for leaving funds to be used
for the pet’s care.”207 There is a similar provision in Section 408
of the Uniform Trust Code: a pet trust may be enforced by “a
person appointed in the terms of the trust or, if no person is so
appointed, by a person appointed by the court.”208 The
comments to this section go on to clarify its meaning:
trust instrument or, if none, by an individual appointed by a
court upon application to it by an individual.
(5) Except as ordered by the court or required by the
trust instrument, no filing, report, registration, periodic
accounting, separate maintenance of funds, appointment, or
fee is required by reason of the existence of the fiduciary
relationship of the trustee.
(6) A court may reduce the amount of the property
transferred, if it determines that that amount substantially
exceeds the amount required for the intended use. The
amount of the reduction, if any, passes as unexpended trust
property under subsection (c)(2).
(7) If no trustee is designated or no designated trustee
is willing or able to serve, a court shall name a trustee. A
court may order the transfer of the property to another
trustee, if required to assure that the intended use is carried
out and if no successor trustee is designated in the trust
instrument or if no designated successor trustee agrees to
serve or is able to serve. A court may also make such other
orders and determinations as shall be advisable to carry out
the intent of the transferor and the purpose of this section.]
207

U.P.C. § 2-907 cmt.

208 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 408(b) (2003), as originally promulgated by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 2000 and
last amended in 2003. See U.T.C. § 408 (Trust For Care Of Animal):

(a) A trust may be created to provide for the care of an
animal alive during the settlor’s lifetime. The trust
terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was
created to provide for the care of more than one animal alive
during the settlor’s lifetime, upon the death of the last
surviving animal.
(b) A trust authorized by this section may be enforced by
a person appointed in the terms of the trust or, if no person
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Section 110(b) grants to the person appointed the
rights of a qualified beneficiary for the purpose of
receiving notices and providing consents. If the
trust is created for the care of an animal, a person
with an interest in the welfare of the animal has
standing to petition for an appointment. The
person appointed by the court to enforce the trust
should also be a person who has exhibited an
interest in the animal’s welfare. The concept of
granting standing to a person with a demonstrated
interest in the animal’s welfare is derived from the
Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings
Act, which allows a person interested in the
welfare of a ward or protected person to file
petitions on behalf of the ward or protected
person.209
The parallels that this comment draws between persons
interested in the welfare of a human ward and persons
interested in the welfare of an animal make clear that this law
treats animals very differently from inanimate property. In
fact, this provision comes closer than any currently codified law
to giving the animals it covers a status that is similar to that of
persons. The laws that create binding pet trusts have thus gone a
long way toward recognizing a new status for companion
animals.

is so appointed, by a person appointed by the court. A person
having an interest in the welfare of the animal may request
the court to appoint a person to enforce the trust or to
remove a person appointed.
(c) Property of a trust authorized by this section may be
applied only to its intended use, except to the extent the
court determines that the value of the trust property exceeds
the amount required for the intended use. Except as
otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, property not
required for the intended use must be distributed to the
settlor, if then living, otherwise to the settlor’s successors in
interest.
209

U.T.C. § 408 cmt (2000).
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A total of twenty-six states now have statutes that authorize
the creation of binding pet trusts.210 Nine of these states have
chosen to enact Section 2-907 of the Uniform Probate Code;211
ten states have adopted a version of the more recent Uniform
Trust Code (UTC) Section 408;212 and seven others that have not
adopted either of the uniform codes have opted to enforce pet
trusts through independent statutes.213
In addition to these increased legal protections, there are
numerous resources to help pet owners provide for their
animals' care after their death. One organization, The Estate
Planning for Pets Foundation, offers a website containing
“information resources for conscientious pet owners and
professionals who assist them.”214 The site offers a range of
resources, including links “for pet owners,” “for lawyers,” and
“for skeptics,” a legal primer, sample language for pet trusts,
links to the relevant statutes in each state, information on tax
210 See Statutory Pet Trusts, http://www.estateplanningforpets.org/legalprimer-statutes.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
211 States using UPC Section 2-907: ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.907 (2006);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2907 (2007), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-901
(West 2006); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15-2 (West 2007), MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 700.2722 (West 2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-1017 (2007);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-4-408 (2006); TEXAS PROP. CODE ANN. §
112.037(2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1001 (2006).
212 States using UTC Section 408: ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-408 (2007);
D.C. CODE § 19-1304.08 (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-408 (2005); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, § 408 (2007); MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.4-408 (West 2007);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3834 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.0075
(LexisNexis 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-408 (LexisNexis 2006);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 46A-4-408 (LexisNexis 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15408 (2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-409 (2006).
213 States using independent versions of pet trusts: FLA. STAT. ANN. §
737.116 (West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633A.2105 (West 2006); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 3B:11-38 (West 2007); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-8.1
(McKinney 2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 128.308 (2003) (repealed); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 11.118.020 (West 2007). In addition, Idaho adopts a “Purpose
Trust,” which appears to include pet trusts. IDAHO. CODE ANN. § 15-7-601
(2006).

Estate Planning for Pets Foundation, Estate Planning for Your Pet,
http://www.estateplanningforpets.org/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
214
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considerations, and methods for calculating the amount of funds
needed for future care.215 Another organization, Pet Guardian,
offers its “PetGuardian Plan,” which provides a pet trust
document, a cost analysis to help determine how much to set
aside for pets, a set of sample pet care instructions, and
emergency identification cards to be posted at home and kept in
wallets.216 In addition, this organization has teamed up with
Best Friends, a large animal sanctuary in Kanab, Utah to provide
what they call “The Best Friends ‘backup’ service,” which helps
to locate alternate caregivers in cases where the originally
designated caregivers become unavailable.217
Similar resources are now being offered by a number of
veterinary schools. The School of Veterinary Medicine at U.C.
Davis recently began offering a program called “Tender Loving
Care for Pets” through its Center for Animals in Society.218 This
program gives animal owners — through a bequest to the
veterinary school — assurance that their pet will be placed in a
“permanent loving home” and will receive life-time health care
at the school’s veterinary hospital if the owner predeceases her
pet.219 The program promises to identify and monitor new
homes for enrolled pets.220 The Veterinary School at Texas
215

See id. at Site Map.

216 See
Pet
Guardian,
About
Our
Service:
Introducing
the
PetGuardian
Pet
Trust
Program,
http://www.petguardian.com/common.php?v_section=2&v_page=2
(last
visited Feb. 9, 2007).

“If you have designated two potential caregivers and set aside
appropriate funds, Best Friends will help locate an alternate caregiver should
anything happen to the initial two designated caregivers.” Id.; see also Best
Friends Animal Sanctuary, http://www.bestfriends.org/ (last visited Feb. 9,
2007).
217

218 See Heather Bloch, Teaching Skill and Compassion, THE BARK, Fall
2005, at 53, 56.

Id.; see also Center for Animals in Society, Tender Loving Care for
Pets (TLC),
http://www.vetmed.ucdavis.edu/Animals_in_Society/tlc/default.htm (last
visited Jan. 23, 2007).
219

220Center for Animals in Society, supra note 219 (navigate to “About TLC
for Pets”).
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A&M University goes even further, providing an on-campus
“Companion Animal Life-Care Center” which “provides the
physical, emotional, and medical needs of companion animals
whose owners are no longer able to provide that care.”221
According to the Center’s web site, its clients include pet owners
who predecease their pet.222 In addition to its full-time staff, the
center houses veterinary students who “live on site to ensure 24
hour care and company for our residents.”223 Resources such as
these make clear the perceived need to help pet owners provide
for their pets’ care after their death. The proliferation of laws
providing for binding pet trusts, together with resources that
take advantage of those laws, demonstrates the magnitude of
this need.
4. Increased Penalties and Protections in Animal
Cruelty Statutes
Criminal laws prohibiting cruelty to animals — which
includes both abuse and neglect — have provided the primary
way in which our legal system has protected animals.224 These
enactments highlight one of the few ways in which the law has
traditionally treated animals differently from other forms of
property, and perhaps has not treated them as “property” at all.
State anti-cruelty statutes, by some accounts, are older than the
country itself225 and date back at least as far as the time of the
221See Texas A&M University, Stevenson Companion Animal Life-Care
Center, The Center, http://www.cvm.tamu.edu/petcare/center.htm (last
visited Jan. 23, 2007).
222

Id.

223 See Texas A&M University, Stevenson Companion Animal Life-Care
Center, Staff, http://www.cvm.tamu.edu/petcare/staff.htm (last visited Jan.
23, 2007).

See Pamela D. Frasch et al., State Animal Anti-Cruelty Statutes: An
Overview, 5 ANIMAL L. 69, 69 (1999).
224

Several sources cite a 1641 law enacted by the Massachusetts Bay
Colony as the first American animal anti-cruelty statute, which stated that
“No man shall exercise any Tirranny or Crueltie towards any Bruite creature
which are usuallie kept for man’s use.” See, e.g., Sunstein, Can Animals
Sue?, supra note 35, at 252; Animal Protection Institute, State Animal
Cruelty
Laws
(Dec.
14,
2004),
formerly
available
at
225
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Civil War.226 At the federal level, animal protection law is more
recent. The Animal Welfare Act was enacted in 1966, and it has
been amended several times since then to strengthen some of
the protections of the animals that it covers.227
The Animal Welfare Act is fairly limited in scope. The law
aims to insure the humane treatment of animals used in
research, for exhibition purposes, or as pets.228 But its
regulations on research only apply to certain warm-blooded
animals, thus excluding farm animals such as livestock and
poultry from protection, and only protecting horses if they are
used for research purposes.229 One provision of the Animal
Welfare Act, known as the “Pet Theft Act,” sets out a series of
rules that aim to prevent pet animals from being stolen and sold
for research.230 Historically, state anti-cruelty laws have been
similarly limited. In the past, both state and federal laws
prohibiting cruelty to animals have been criticized for their
limited coverage, insufficient penalties, numerous exemptions,
and low enforcement rates.231
What is notable about the state animal cruelty laws, however,
is the extent to which they have been strengthened in the past
http://www.api4animals.org/47.htm (on file with author). See also U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LIBRARY, ANIMAL
WELFARE INFORMATION CENTER,
http://www.nal.usda.gov/awic/pubs/HumanAnimalBond/HumanAnimalBo
nd.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2007); and Big Cat Rescue, State Animal
Cruelty Laws, http://www.bigcatrescue.org/animalwelfarelaws.htm (last
visited Jan. 23, 2007)
226

See supra note 34.

227 Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131-2156 (2007) (amended in 1970,
1976, 1985 and 1990).
228

7 U.S.C. § 2131(1) (2007).

229

Id. § 2132 (g).

230

Id. § 2158.

231 For limitations of anti-cruelty statutes, see Thomas G. Kelch, Toward
a Non-Property Status for Animals, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 531, 540-41 (1988).
The article, however, was published in 1988, and a number of changes,
including increased penalties, have occurred since then. See infra notes 232242 and accompanying text.
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decade or so. As recently as 1993, almost all state animal cruelty
laws provided for offenses that were, at most, misdemeanors.232
Only seven states at that time had felony animal abuse laws on
their books.233 By 1999, twenty-three states had at least one
form of felony law for animal abuse.234 As of the end of 2004, a
total of forty-one states and the District of Columbia consider at
least some types of animal abuse a felony.235 In addition to
increasing penalties, state animal cruelty statutes have
strengthened their reach by expanding the definition of animals
covered by the statute and by broadening the range of offenses
to include, for example, animal fighting and ear-cropping of
dogs.236 Many states have amended their statutes to allow
courts to impose additional penalties, such as requiring
reimbursement for the cost of caring for the injured animal,
See Stephan K. Otto, State Animal Protection Laws—The Next
Generation, 11 ANIMAL L. 131 (2005).
232

233 See id at 132 n.1: “California, Florida, Massachusetts, Montana,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin had all enacted felony animal abuse
provisions by 1993.”
234

See Frasch et al., supra note 224, at 69.

See
HUMAN SOCIETY OF THE UNITED
STATES,
STATE
ANIMAL ANTI-CRUELTY PROVISIONS (2005), http://www.hsus.org/webfiles/PDF/State_cruelty_chart_June05-pdf.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
See also Otto, supra note 232, at 132. Note, however, the limitations to the
felony laws:
235

[S]tates are currently reserving felony status for the
most egregious, affirmative acts of abuse, and are requiring a
high degree of criminal culpability. Many states are also
restricting felony status to only subsequent offenses. Others
are further restricting felonies to include only those crimes
committed against certain species of animals, typically those
either defined as, or generally considered to be, companion
animals.
Id. at 137.
236 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-203(c)(ii) and (g) (2006) (defining
cruelty to animals as owning dogs with the intent to allow the dogs to engage
in fights, or being knowingly present at such a fight); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5511(h) (West 2007) (requiring a licensed veterinarian to perform any earcropping surgery).
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requiring behavioral counseling, and seizing the animals that
are being mistreated or neglected.237 Courts may also enjoin
defendants from owning animals during a probation period, and
some may even order defendants to forfeit their right to possess
animals in the future.238
State anti-cruelty statutes not only prohibit abusive
treatment of animals, but many of these state laws impose
affirmative duties on people who care for animals.239 For
example, California law makes it a misdemeanor for an owner to
permit the animal to be without “proper care and attention.”240
Another provision requires animal depositaries to “provide the
animals with necessary and prompt veterinary care, nutrition,
and shelter, and treat them kindly.”241 While the “treat them
kindly” provision may be unique to California, laws imposing
affirmative duties for proper housing, veterinary care, and
feeding of animals are becoming increasingly common.242
Another interesting feature of the state anti-cruelty laws is
how much their coverage can vary by state. Unlike the area of
enforceable pet trusts, where most state laws are adopted either
from the Uniform Probate Code or Uniform Trust Code, there is
no uniform law of animal protection. Rather, each state has its
own unique statute prohibiting cruelty to animals, and while
there may be some commonalities among these statutes, there
are also important differences in the acts prohibited, animals
covered, penalties, and exemptions. Thus, in addition to the
See,
e.g.,
Paige
M.
Tomaselli,
International
Comparative
Animal
Cruelty
Laws,
available
at
http://www.animallaw.info/articles/ddusicacl.htm
(“Commonly seen
provisions in these laws are: counseling, community service, restitution,
seizure, reimbursement for cost of care, forfeiture of the animal, veterinary
reporting, and arrest policies.) See also Corwin R. Kruse, Comment, Baby
Steps: Minnesota Raises Certain Forms of Animal Cruelty to Felony Status,
28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1649 (2002).
237

238

See Tomaselli, supra note 237.

239

See Sunstein, Can Animals Sue, supra note 35, at 252.

240

CAL. PENAL CODE § 597f(a) (West 2007).

241

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1834 (West 2007).

242

See Sunstein, Can Animals Sue, supra note 35, at 252-53.
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limited protections of the Animal Welfare Act, which applies
across all states, individual states, through their own animal
cruelty statutes, are able to provide protections that can respond
to the unique needs of that state. In Tennessee, for example, the
crime of cruelty to animals includes “inflict[ing] burns, cuts,
lacerations, or other injuries or pain, by any method, including
blistering compounds, to the legs or hooves of horses.”243 This
provision is a specific response to the local practice of “soring”
(as in “making sore”), in various ways, the feet of Tennessee
Walking Horses to exaggerate the high-stepping gait for which
these horses are valued.244
State law prohibiting animal cruelty is extremely dynamic.
In addition to the many changes seen in the past decade, many
more are in the works. In a number of jurisdictions, there are
numerous proposed bills pending approval which would further
strengthen current animal cruelty laws.
Several features of these newly enhanced animal cruelty
statutes are worth noting because they resemble the features of
laws prohibiting child abuse in a number of ways. Such
provisions provide another indication that animals are being
treated less like property, or at least less like inanimate forms of
property. In 1999, there were nine states that either required
the reporting of animal abuse or provided immunity for
veterinarians who report such abuse.245 Currently, ten states
have such features in their laws.246 Such reporting features,
243

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-202(a)(5) (2007).

244 “[T]his breed has suffered from cruel and abusive shoeing and
training tactics to make the horses achieve their high step. ‘Soring’ is the
application of stinging or burning agents to the back of the foot to encourage
the horse to raise its feet up.” eHow, How to Choose a Tennessee
Walker, http://www.ehow.com/how_9044_choose-tennessee-walker.html
(last visited Feb. 9, 2007).
245

Frasch et al, supra note 224, at 75.

See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-64-121 (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 7, § 4018 (2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 58B (West 2006);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-39-87 (2006); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6714 (McKinney
2007); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 801.3585 (Vernon 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
26, § 2404 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-796.76 (2007); and MD. CODE REGS.
15.14.15.01 (2005) (all providing veterinarian reporting immunity). Illinois
also requires veterinarians to report abuse. See 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
115/25-19 (West 2007).
246
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especially in states where reporting is mandated, are notable in
the way they resemble child abuse reporting statutes. Another
feature of interest is the potential for court-ordered counseling
for offenders. At least sixteen states have provisions in their
animal cruelty statutes that allow courts to order offenders to
undergo psychological or behavioral counseling.247
These
provisions recognize that people who abuse animals are not only
more likely to do so again, but that they are also more likely to
engage in violent crimes against people. Provisions that allow
courts to mandate counseling are aimed at preventing both
types of abuse.
Another way in which animal cruelty laws are recognizing
the connection between violence toward animals and violence
toward people is by including provisions such as those in a 2001
amendment to the Oregon animal cruelty statute.248 This
amendment allows for increased penalties for those convicted of
animal cruelty if the offender has a prior conviction of animal
abuse, domestic violence, or an offense committed against a
minor child.249 The provision also allows for increased penalties
for offenders who knowingly commit the animal abuse in the
presence of a minor child.250 The Oregon statute, therefore, not
only ties animal abuse together with domestic violence and child
abuse, but it appears to create a special category of abuse that
247 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-62-101(c) (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189-202(2)(a.5)(II), (III) (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.12(2)(a) (West
2006); 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/3-02 (West 2007); IOWA CODE ANN. §
717B.3A(3)(a)(1) (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1031 (3-B)
(2007); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-606(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2006); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.50b(4) (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
343.21(10)(4) (West 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:22-17(d) (West 2007)
(counseling for adjudicated juvenile delinquents), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-181(G) (LexisNexis 2007), OR. REV. STAT. § 167.350(4) (2006); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-14-212(f) (2007), UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-301(9)(a) (2006), VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 353(b)(4) (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-796.122(F) (2007).
248

OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 167.320 (4)(a) (West 2006).

249

Id.

250 Id. § 167.320 (4)(b) (West 2006) (“For purposes of this paragraph, a
minor child is in the immediate presence of animal abuse if the abuse is seen
or directly perceived in any other manner by the minor child.”). See also
Otto, supra note 232, at 146 (citing OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 167.320).
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bridges both animal abuse and child abuse, that is, animal abuse
in the presence of a child.
State cruelty laws, at a minimum, recognize that animals
have the capacity to suffer, and these laws seek to reduce that
suffering. In states where a particular type of animal suffering is
prevalent, such as the abuse of Tennessee Walking Horses, state
laws recognize and specifically prohibit that form of abuse.
Moreover, animal cruelty laws in a number of states recognize a
connection between abusing animals and abusing people.
Taken together, these various features of anti-cruelty statutes
lead to the unmistakable conclusion that the means by which
such laws protect animals goes a long way towards recognizing a
legal status for animals that is significantly different from that of
other forms of property under the law.
5. Language Shift from “Owner” to “Guardian”
There is one additional statutory change that is worth noting,
although its significance is more symbolic than legally
meaningful. One state law and fifteen local ordinances have
changed the language describing the relationship between
people and their animals from “owner” to “guardian.”251 Some
of these laws, such as Rhode Island’s state law on animal
cruelty, have actually supplemented, rather than replaced
“owner” terminology with the word “guardian.”252 Furthermore,
as the statute makes clear, this language change does not alter in
any way a person’s legal obligations to her animals:
251 See R.I. GEN LAWS § 4-1-1(a)(4) (2006); See also National Ass’n for
Biomedical Research, Animal Law Section, Ownership v. Guardianship,
http://www.nabr.org/AnimalLaw/Guardianship/index.htm (last visited Jan..
23, 2007) (listing the 15 cites or towns and the state of Rhode Island that
include guardianship language in their laws).
252 See
R.I.
GEN.
LAWS
§ 4-1-1(a)(4),
§ 4-13-1.2(10),
and
§ 4-19-2(28) (2006) (adding the definition of “guardian” but
not
removing
“Owner
keeper”);
BOULDER,
COLO.,
CODE
§ 6-1-2
(2005)
(“‘Guardian’
means
owner”),
available at
http://www.bouldercolorado.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie
w&id=1856&Itemid=655 (last visited Feb. 1, 2007); BERKELEY, CAL.,
CODE § 10.04.010 (2001) (defining “Owner/guardian”), available at
http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/bmc/berkeley_municipal_code/title_10/04/0
10.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2007); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., CODE art. I § 41(m)
(2003) (allowing “guardian” and “owner” to be used interchangeably in the
Code).
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“Guardian” shall mean a person(s) having the
same rights and responsibilities of an owner, and
both terms shall be used interchangeably. A
guardian shall also mean a person who possesses,
has title to or an interest in, harbors or has control,
custody or possession of an animal and who is
responsible for an animal’s safety and wellbeing.253
Although Rhode Island is the only state to have made such a
change to its animal protection laws, there are a total of fifteen
cities or towns – including Boulder, Colorado; Berkeley, West
Hollywood, and San Francisco, California; St. Louis, Missouri;
and Woodstock, New York – that have enacted similar language
changes.254
While it appears that these language changes have no real
legal effect,255 the laws have generated a good deal of
controversy, and two sides have emerged, staking out opposing
positions. Proponents hope that by changing the legal language
from owner to guardian, the attitudes and understanding about
our responsibilities to animals will change for the better.256
Those who promoted such laws hope that they will serve an
educational role, and will help people see that they have greater
responsibilities to their pets than to other property that they
own, even though these laws do not actually alter animals’ legal
status as property.257 Groups that oppose such language
changes, including a number of veterinary groups, claim that
253

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-1-1(a)(4) (2006).

254 See National Ass’n for Biomedical Research, Animal Law Section,
Ownership v. Guardianship, supra note 254.
255 But see id.: “While this campaign is marketed as a feel-good exercise,
this ‘simple’ change in language elevates animals above their current status
as property – with potentially enormous legal implications.”

See R. Scott Nolen, Owners or guardians? Cities change identity of
pet owners, hoping to promote welfare, J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, April
15, 2001, http://www.avma.org/onlnews/javma/apr01/s041501b.asp (last
visited Jan. 23, 2007).
256

See Huss, Separation, Custody, and Estate Planning, supra note
1488, at 197-99 and accompanying text.
257
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such changes threaten to undermine, rather than strengthen,
the relationship between people and their pets.258 They claim,
for example, that pet “guardians” might be faced with more
limited health care choices for their pets, and that veterinarians
might have trouble clarifying who should be making the choices
regarding an animal’s care.259 Codifying this opposition, the
American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) – the
veterinary equivalent of the AMA – has adopted an official
position statement against such terminology changes. Approved
by their executive board in May 2003, their resolution reads as
follows:
Ownership vs. Guardianship
The American Veterinary Medical Association
promotes the optimal health and well-being of
animals. Further, the AVMA recognizes the role of
responsible owners in providing for their animals’
care. Any change in terminology describing the
relationship between animals and owners does not
strengthen this relationship and may, in fact,
diminish it. Such changes in terminology may
decrease the ability of veterinarians to provide
services and, ultimately, result in animal
suffering.260
The AVMA may have additional concerns with the
implications of the changes in terminology for their member
veterinarians that are not expressed in their official position
statement. Similar opposition has been expressed by the
American Veterinary Medical Law Association (AVMLA), whose
“White Paper” raises numerous legal concerns that could arise
for veterinarians if their clients become guardians rather than
owners of animals.261
258 See AVMA Opposes ‘Pet Guardianship’: No Evidence ‘Guardianship’
Enhances Relationship between Owner and Pet, JAVMA NEWS, July 1, 2003,
http://www.avma.org/onlnews/javma/jul03/030701i.asp (last visted Jan.
23, 2007).
259

Id.

260

Id.

261 See AMERICAN VETERINARY MEDICAL LAW ASS’N, OWNERSHIP OF
ANIMALS VS. GUARDIANSHIP OF ANIMALS: THE EFFECT OF A CHANGE IN THE
LAW ON VETERINARIANS IN CALIFORNIA (2002), available at

373

Winter 2007

Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy

Vol 4:2

Pressure from groups such as the AVMA and AVMLA was
presumably behind a resolution recently adopted by the Council
of State Governments (CSG) Governing Boards, which sets out
its opposition to “legislation that reclassifies pet, livestock or
animal owners as guardians or that otherwise alters the legal
status of animals.”262 The reasons the CSG gives for its
resolution include a claim that such statutes would limit owners’
freedom of choice in caring for their animals, permit third
parties to petition for a pet’s custody, permit a legal challenge to
treatment choices of owners and veterinarians, and generally
threaten the legal balance between the rights of pet owners and
the well-being of animals.263 This resolution was adopted in
September of 2004.264 Given its adoption, it is unlikely that
many states will be following Rhode Island’s lead in
supplementing or changing the language of animal “owner” to
that of animal “guardian.”265
It may seem curious that there is so much organized
opposition to a change in language that has no current legal
effect. At first blush, one might expect veterinarians who treat
companion animals to embrace such language. The concerns
regarding the use of the term “guardian” for pet owners appear
to center around fears of where such language could lead. It is
this fear that has generated opposition from groups of
http://www.nabr.org/AnimalLaw/Guardianship/AVMLAWhitePaper.pdf
(last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
The same resolution also sets out the CSG’s opposition to any
legislation that allows recovery of non-economic damages for the loss or
injury of a pet, including its opposition to recovery for loss of companionship
and negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Council of State
Governments,
Policy
Resolutions,
Fall
2004,
available
at
http://www.csg.org/CSG/Policy/CSG+policy+positions/default.htm
(last
visited Feb. 1, 2007).
262

263

Id.

264

Id.

265As one commentator has noted, however, it may matter less whether
more states and localities ultimately change language in their animal
protection laws from owner to guardian, and more that such debates are
happening at all. See Huss, Separation, Custody, and Estate Planning,
supra note 1488, at 199-200.
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veterinarians, researchers, and state legislators against the
“potentially enormous legal implications”266 of what many
proponents see as a simple language change to help better
educate the public about responsibilities toward pets.
Proponents want to see more responsible pet ownership, while
opponents seem to fear the implications of moving toward
personhood status for pets. The problem seems to lie in the
potential legal implications of a term – guardian – that already
carries a legally significant meaning, when used in reference to
pets.267 Because of the legal implications of the term “guardian”
in relationships between people,268 those who take a more
conservative approach to any changes in the legal status of pets
fear the implications of legislating the use of this term to
describe pet owners.
Educating pet owners about their responsibilities appears to
be a laudable goal and certainly not a controversial one. If that
goal is going to be accomplished through changes in statutory
language or other changes to the legal status of pets, it needs to
be done through a new legal category and through terminology
that is not already fraught with legal meaning that will raise the
concerns and fears of people who work with animals. The next
part of this article proposes just such a category.

266

See National Ass’n for Biomedical Research, supra note 254.

267 In fact, this very concern is explicitly addressed in the March 9, 2005
position statement of the Pennsylvania Veterinary Medical Association
(PVMA), setting out its opposition to the change to guardian language:
“Guardian is a well-defined legal term that is not appropriate in describing
the relationship between owners and their animals.” See Pennsylvania
Veterinary Medical Ass’n, Position Statements, (Mar. 9, 2005),
http://www.pavma.org/Images/05_Position_Stmnts_UNP.pdf (last visited
Feb. 1, 2007).
268 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 725 (8th ed. 2004) (defining guardian as
“one who has the legal authority and duty to care for another’s person or
property”) (emphasis added).
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PART IV: THE ABOVE DESCRIBED LEGAL
CHANGES SHOULD BE FORMALLY RECOGNIZED
BY CREATING A NEW LEGAL CATEGORY FOR
COMPANION ANIMALS
As the above sections demonstrate, public attitudes and
many of our current laws already reflect the numerous ways in
which non-human animals, and especially companion animals,
are treated fundamentally differently from inanimate property.
Cruelty statutes recognize that animals can suffer from
inhumane treatment. Accordingly, more and more states are
making such treatment a felony offense.
Many animal
protection statutes go even further, imposing a number of
affirmative duties on owners or guardians to care for their
animals properly. Other areas of law, ranging from estates and
trusts, to marriage dissolution and tort law, are increasingly
recognizing a different status for companion animals by
acknowledging the bond that can exist between humans and the
animals they care for. In many states, companion animals can
now benefit from enforceable trusts after an owner’s death,
courts are showing an increasing willingness to consider an
animal’s interest in custody decisions, and both courts and
legislatures are finding ways of awarding damages above “fair
market value” when a companion animal is killed or injured.269
Despite these trends, the differences between animals and
inanimate property need to be more clearly reflected in our laws,
because there are still too many cases where the results under
current laws are inconsistent with this understanding of the
status of companion animals. Many courts continue to struggle
with appropriate damage awards in tort cases.270 While some
recent cases have seen awards as high as $30,000 on “actual
value to owner” theories,271 other courts (even those that seem
quite sympathetic to arguments that companion animals are
simply different from other fungible property) feel that their
hands are tied by existing laws that define animals as
269

See supra Parts II and III.

270

See supra Part II.

271

See supra notes 74-75.
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property.272 Such problems could be alleviated by formally
creating a new legal status for companion animals – a category
that recognizes that, while animal are not persons, there are
many reasons for the law to treat them differently from fungible
personal property.
A separate legal category for companion animals has both
intuitive appeal and would better reflect the way in which we
value companion animals in our society. First, the category
would appeal to the intuitive notion that many judges have
expressed: that “[pets occupy] a special place somewhere in
between a person and a piece of personal property,”273 and that
the property label “inadequately and inaccurately describes the
relationship between a human and a dog.”274 There is a
tremendous amount of evidence that our society values
companion animals in a way that is fundamentally different
from the way we value other property. For example, we spend
large amounts of money on their veterinary care, give pets
birthday presents, get them pet sitters or leave them in “doggie
day care,”275 take pets on vacations with us, 276 and make serious
efforts to provide for their care after our death.277 An even more
vivid reminder of just how highly people value their animals was
demonstrated by all of those who refused to evacuate Hurricane

272

See, e.g., supra notes 140-142 and accompanying text.

Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1979).
273

274

Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Wis. 2001).

275 See, e.g., Sharene Azimi, Move Over Subway, Dog Day Care is the
Hot New Franchise, COLUMBIA NEWS SERVICE, March 1, 2005,
http://jscms.jrn.columbia.edu/cns/2005-03-01/azimi-doggydaycare
(last
visited Jan. 23, 2007).

See, e.g., Pets on the Go, Pet Travel Unleashed,
http://www.petsonthego.com/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2007); Pets Welcome, It’s
a Pet Friendly Universe Out There, http://www.petswelcome.com/ (last
visited Feb. 1, 2007); Pet Travel, U.S., http://www.pettravel.us/ (last visited
Feb. 1, 2007).
276

277

See supra notes 205-2177 and accompanying text.
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Katrina-damaged New Orleans without their animals.278 These
refusals caused so many problems that the evacuation policy
was quickly changed, and those boarding the buses evacuating
Texas residents as Hurricane Rita approached were allowed to
bring their pets along.279
A legal approach recognizing companion animals as falling
somewhere between persons and inanimate property would be
consistent with the most conservative scientific and moral
theories of animals’ status. While there is much disagreement
about the extent of animal intelligence, ability for selfrecognition, theory of mind, intentionality, and autonomy,280 no
one seriously questions the capacity of companion animals such
as dogs and cats to suffer, or to feel pain.281 This agreement can
in part be seen in the frequency with which is quoted a famous
line of Jeremy Bentham: “the question is not, Can they reason?
Nor, Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?”282 This capacity to
suffer, a capacity that is certainly not shared by inanimate
property, provides another reason to create a distinct legal
category for companion animals.
See, e.g., Craig Guillot, Not Without My Dog: For Many, Leaving
Four-Legged Companions Behind wasn’t an Option, THE BARK, Winter
2005, at 85.
278

279 See Gina Spadafori, Including Pets in Evacuation Plans Could Save
Human Lives, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 13, 2005, at C6, available at
http://www.boston.com/yourlife/home/articles/2005/10/13/including_pets_i
n_evacuation_plans_could_save_human_lives/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).

See generally Lesley J. Rogers & Gisela Kaplan, All Animals Are Not
Equal: The Interface between Scientific Knowledge and Legislation for
Animal Rights, in ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 175.
280

281 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights of Animals, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
387, 388 (2003) [hereinafter Sunstein, The Rights of Animals]. “Almost
everyone agrees that people should not be able to torture animals or to
engage in acts of cruelty against them.” Id. at 389.

JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 310-11
n.1 (Prometheus Books, 1988) (1823), quoted in Sunstein, The Rights of
Animals, supra note 284; Patrick Lee, Soul, Body, and Personhood, 49 AM. J.
JURIS. 87, 117 (2004); Martha C. Nussbaum, Animal Rights: The Need for a
Theoretical Basis, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1506, 1524 (2001) (reviewing STEVEN M.
WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS (2000))
(describing Bentham’s language as “a famous footnote”).
282
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A. A NEW LEGAL CATEGORY: COMPANION ANIMAL
PROPERTY
This article proposes the legislative creation of a new status
that formally recognizes companion animals as a distinct legal
category: “companion animal property.” This proposal takes up
Judge Andell’s call that “[t]he law should reflect society’s
recognition that animals are sentient and emotive beings that
are capable of providing companionship to the humans with
whom they live.”283 The “companion animal property” category
would thus take into account companion animals’ dependence
on their human owners, their capacity to suffer if mistreated or
neglected, and the bonds that we form with our animals and that
they form with us. The resulting legal category would clarify, in
ways that our current laws do not yet achieve, that we therefore
have certain responsibilities toward our living property that we
simply do not have toward inanimate property.
The companion animal property category acknowledges the
capacity for humans to form strong bonds with their animal
companions. Evidence of these bonds is already seen in a
number of ways within the veterinary profession. For example,
the amounts of money that people are willing to spend on
treating their companion animals has given rise to the growth of
many specialty areas within the field of small animal
medicine.284 And a large number of veterinary schools now have
bereavement programs that help people deal with the loss of

Bueckner v. Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368, 378 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994)
(Andell, J. concurring).
283

284 See Green, supra note 3, at 170, 210 (reporting that pet owners spend
more than $19 billion annually on veterinary care and that such spending has
provided veterinarians with “limitless opportunities to expand the practice of
their craft.”). The American Veterinary Medical Association formally
recognizes thirty-six veterinary specialties. Id. at 211. It is likely that
somewhat different forces are driving the growth of specialty areas in other
parts of veterinary practice. In equine medicine, for example, owners are
often willing to spend large amounts on animals for a variety of reasons,
sometimes because of the bonds they have formed with pet horses, but often
because of the high market value of race horses.
See, e.g., Julie
Rovner, Q&A: Modern Medicine for Barbaro, NPR.ORG, May 24, 2006,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5428731
(last
visited March 2, 2007).
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their companion animal.285 Other schools have programs that
specifically study the human-animal bond.286
In addition to recognizing the bonds between humans and
animals, formally creating a new legal category for companion
animals leads to more consistency in the law and would help to
make sense of a number of judicial and legislative trends that
have been emerging in the past decade or more. As discussed
above, changes are occurring in areas of law as diverse as estates
and trusts, criminal law and tort law, but these changes are
happening in an uneven fashion, which can lead to a variety of
anomalous results. Within the same jurisdiction, for example,
an animal might be the subject of an enforceable trust that is
funded with a large amount of money, but if that same animal is
negligently killed, its guardian may not be able to recover more
than its minimal market value. In one state, owners of a
negligently injured animal might not even be able to recover
veterinary expenses to pay for treatment made necessary by the
injury. Yet in other states, the same owner might be able to
recover treatment expenses, along with compensatory damages
for emotional distress and punitive damages.287 Officially
recognizing these changes by creating a legal category for
companion animals will lead to more consistency both within
and across these various areas of law.

285 See, e.g., Colorado State University, Argus Institute for Families and
Veterinary Medicine, http://www.argusinstitute.colostate.edu/grief.htm (last
visited Jan. 23, 2007); Cornell University College of Veterinary Medicine,
Pet Loss Support Hotline, http://www.vet.cornell.edu/Org/PetLoss/ (last
visited Jan. 23, 2007); and University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,
College of Veterinary Medicine, C.A.R.E. Pet Loss Helpline,
http://www.cvm.uiuc.edu/CARE/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
286 See, e.g., Animal Medical Center, Hospital Services – Counseling,
http://www.amcny.org/department/counseling.htm (last visited Jan. 23,
2007);
Penn
Veterinary
Medicine,
Clinical
Services,
http://www.vet.upenn.edu/ryan/services/socialwork/ (last visited Jan. 23,
2007); Purdue University School of Veterinary Medicine, Center for the
Human-Animal Bond, http://www.vet.purdue.edu/chab/index.htm (last
visited Jan. 23, 2007).
287 While it is true having different approaches in different states is a
cornerstone of federalism, it may well be problematic when neighboring
states have such disparate approaches.
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B. COMPARISONS TO OTHER PROPOSALS ON ANIMALS’
LEGAL STATUS
Creating a new legal category for companion animals that
treats them as an enhanced type of property – one that
recognizes their important differences from inanimate property
– would likely gain greater acceptance and avoid much of the
controversy generated by other proposals that can be grouped
into the “animal rights” camp. The most controversial of these
proposals are those that aim to completely change the property
status of animals, seeking instead a form of legal “personhood”
for animals.288 Less controversial proposals range from one that
would create a different type of property status where animals
retain an “equitable self-ownership” in their own title,289 to an
argument that animal rights already exist, but they need to be
better enforced by allowing actions by private citizens and by
animals represented by human beings.290
A number of commentators would eliminate animals’
property status altogether and grant them a legal status akin to
personhood. Steven Wise asserts that humans enjoy rights that
are not available to nonhuman animals because of “speciesism,”
discrimination against other animal species that cannot be
justified by any meaningful differences between humans and
other animals.291 Instead, he sets out a quality that he calls
“practical autonomy,”292 which he argues is sufficient to entitle
288 See infra notes 295-300 (discussing the theories of Steven Wise and
Gary Francione).
289

See infra notes 301-306 (discussing the David Favre proposal).

290

See infra notes 307-312 (discussing the theories of Cass Sunstein).

See, e.g., Steven M. Wise, Animal Rights, One Step at a Time, in
ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 19 [hereinafter Wise, One Step at a Time].
“To avoid speciesism, we must identify some objective, rational, legitimate,
and nonarbitrary quality possessed by every Homo sapiens that is possessed
by no nonhuman that should entitle all of us, but none of them, to basis
liberty rights. But none exists.” Id. at 27.
291

Wise defines “practical autonomy” as the ability to desire,
intentionally try to fulfill the desire, and possess “a sense of self sufficiency to
allow her to understand, even dimly, that she is a being who wants something
and is trying to get it.” Id. at 32. See also STEVEN M. WISE, DRAWING THE
LINE: SCIENCE AND THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 32 (2002).
292
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any species to basic liberty rights.293 Gary Francione also
advocates for eliminating the property status of animals and
granting them legal personhood.294 Francione rejects any
compromise proposals that retain animals’ legal status as
property.295 He advocates extending to animals “the right not to
be property” and sees the only other option to be making them
moral persons.296 Francione agrees with Wise that it is
unjustifiable speciesism, rather than any morally justifiable
difference, that accounts for the property status of nonhuman
animals.297
David Favre takes issue with animal activists like Wise and
Francione who want to eliminate animals’ property status,
claiming that such a stance is both unwise and unnecessary.298
Favre not only sees such a change in the status of animals as
highly unlikely, but he also believes that such a change is a bad
idea, especially if it leads to the elimination of domesticated
Furthermore, Favre believes that eliminating
animals.299
property status for animals is unnecessary because, in his view,
there is another way to improve the legal status of animals: by
retaining animals’ status as property but dividing their title into
legal and equitable components, creating a form of self-

293

Wise, One Step at a Time, supra note 294, at 27.

See Francione, Animals as Property, supra note 16, at i, and
Francione, Persons or Property?, supra note 19, at 108.
294

GARY L. FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY
ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1 (1996).
295

OF THE

296 Francione, Persons or Property?, supra note 19, at 131 (“Nor can we
use animal welfare laws to render animals ‘quasi-persons’ or ‘things plus.’ . . .
There is no third choice.”).

Id. at 130-31. “In the end, the only difference between humans and
animals is species, and species is not a justification for treating animals as
property any more than is race a justification for human slavery.” Id. at 131.
297

298 See David Favre, Integrating Animal Interests into Our Legal
System, 10 ANIMAL L. 87, 90 (2004) [hereinafter Favre, Integrating Animal
Interests].
299

Id. at 91.
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ownership that he calls “equitable self-ownership.”300 With his
proposal, Favre hopes to “shift the nature of the relationship
between the owner and the animal from that which is like the
ownership of [a] rock to that which is more like, but not
identical to, the custodial relationship of the human parent and
the human child.”301 Favre seeks to achieve this goal by
blending the previously separated categories of property
ownership and juristic persons.302 He envisions that this new
status will lead to changes in the legal obligations that humans
have to the animals in their care, and that the nature of these
duties will arise primarily from two sources: (1) animal
protection (anti-cruelty) statutes and (2) legal concepts that
define the relationship between parents and children.303
Cass Sunstein’s approach is similar in some respects to
Favre’s. Sunstein argues that animals already enjoy many
rights, if we understand “rights” to mean legal protections
against harm.304 State anti-cruelty laws, along with the federal
laws such as the Animal Welfare Act, provide these rights to
animals.305 Sunstein, like Favre, thus focuses on the role of
existing laws to provide protections for animals. The problem is
not that animals lack protections or rights, but that these rights

300 See David Favre, Equitable Self-Ownership for Animals, 50 DUKE L.J.
473, 476 (2000) [hereinafter Favre, Equitable Self-Ownership]. See also
David Favre, A New Property Status for Animals: Equitable Self-Ownership,
in ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 234, 237 [hereinafter Favre, A New
Property Status].
301

Favre, A New Property Status, supra note 303, at 238-39.

302 Id. at 245. Cf. Jessica Berg, Owning Persons: The Application of
Property Theory to Embryos and Fetuses, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 159
(2005) (proposing a combined property and person framework for analyzing
disputes relating to embryos and fetuses).
303

Favre, A New Property Status, supra note 303, at 245.

304 Sunstein, Introduction: What are Animal Rights?, in ANIMAL RIGHTS,
supra note 18, at 3, 5 [hereinafter Sunstein, What are Animal Rights?].
305 Sunstein, Can Animals Sue?, supra note 35, at 252. Sunstein goes as
far as to suggest that these federal laws might be seen as a bill of rights for
animals. Id. at 255.
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are not adequately enforced.306 Sunstein proposes closing this
“enforcement gap” by allowing private parties to bring actions
directly against those who violate state or federal laws.307 He
additionally advocates allowing animals to bring suits against
such violators through human representatives.308 Animals’
status can best be improved by first improving enforcement of
their existing rights. Sunstein is less concerned over whether
animals are classified as property or persons and more
concerned with the specific rights and duties that such labeling
might suggest.309

C. A SUGGESTED STARTING POINT TO DEFINING
COMPANION ANIMAL PROPERTY
The goal of this section is to suggest a starting point for
defining the new legal category, “companion animal
property.”310 The hope is that the ideas proposed here will begin
a conversation of how the legal status of companion animals can
be changed incrementally to better recognize the bonds between
306 See Sunstein, What are Animal Rights?, supra note 307, at 7
(discussing the “enforcement gap”).
307

Sunstein, Can Animals Sue?, supra note 35, at 261.

308

Id. at 252.

309

Sunstein, What are Animal Rights?, supra note 307, at 11.
What does it mean to say that animals are property and
can be “owned”? . . . Ownership is just a label, connoting a
certain set of rights and perhaps duties . . . . A state could
dramatically increase enforcement of existing bans on
cruelty and neglect without turning animals into persons, or
making them into something other than property. . . . It
might, in these circumstances, seem puzzling that so many
people are focusing on the question of whether animals are
property.

Id.
310 The ideas proposed here are only the beginnings of what I hope will
be an ongoing discussion. In my next article I expect to further flesh out the
proposal I have begun here.
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humans and their companion animals, to continue legal trends
that have already begun, and to gain broader acceptance than
the proposals that would grant personhood status to animals.
This article’s proposal of creating a legal category of
“companion animal property” would, like Sunstein’s proposal,
retain the property status of animals and not take on the battle
of changing their status to one approaching that of persons. The
proposal advocates an incremental change in the legal status of
companion animals to more accurately reflect the direction that
our laws, especially the recent developments in trust law,311 are
going.
There are a number of ways to define and limit the
companion animal property category so as to avoid various
parade-of-horrors scenarios312 put forth by those who object to
anything that smacks of “animal rights.”313 One limitation
would focus on the animal’s role and its relationship with its
human owner or guardian. Such a limitation can be found in
Carolyn Matlack’s proposed legal category for companion
animals that she calls “sentient property.”314 Matlack, an
attorney who is the president and managing editor of Animal
Legal Report Services, sets forth her “sentient property”
But see Favre, Integrating Animal Interests, supra note 301, at 94
(describing the recent changes in trust law as “a conceptual breakthrough for
the United States Legal System.
Animals have been granted legal
personhood for the purposes of trust enforcement.”)
311

312 Objections to changes in the legal status of animals range from claims
that people will no longer be able to keep animals as pets, to claims that we’ll
no longer be able to kill the rats and mice (or even cockroaches) that invade
our homes, to the end of all research involving animals. See, e.g., Center for
Consumer Freedom, Here Come the Animal Activists. Hide the Bug Spray,
Sept. 26, 2006, available at
http://www.consumerfreedom.com/news_detail.cfm/headline/3137
(last
visited March 2, 2007). This proposal would not affect any of these scenarios.

One commentator who has come out strongly against animal rights
admits that “it would be simply insane to insist that animals should be
treated like inanimate objects.” Richard A. Epstein, Animals as Objects, or
Subjects, of Rights, in ANIMAL LAW, supra note 18, at 143, 156.
313

314 See Letter from Carolyn Matlack to the Texas Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, (Apr. 13, 2004) (on file with author) (proposing and defining the
category “sentient property”) [hereinafter Matlack, Letter].
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category as a compromise on the legal status of pets that would
recognize them as living, feeling companions but would not give
them anything approaching the rights of persons.315 Matlack
defines sentient property as “any warm blooded, domesticated
nonhuman animal dependent on one or more humans for food,
shelter, veterinary care, or compassion and typically kept in or
near the household of its owner, guardian, or keeper.”316 Her
definition thus focuses on the animal’s dependence on its owner
and the closeness of its living arrangements. The only limitation
on the type of animal would be that it is warm-blooded and
domesticated.
This article proposes a companion animal property category
that would be even more limited. First, it would focus on the
animal’s role and would clarify that the category only applies to
companion animals, or pets, and not to domesticated farm
animals that might live near their owner’s home. Second,
instead of applying to any warm-blooded animal, this category
would limit, by species, the types of animals to which it would
apply. As a starting point, the category would be limited to
animals that are typically kept as pets: dogs and cats.317 While
this new legal category would begin with this very narrowly
defined class of animals, it might also be reasonable to set out
ways in which the definition could start with a presumption that
it only applies to dogs and cats, but allow for evidence that other
animals could qualify as companion animals if certain criteria
315 See
R.
Scott
Nolen,
Sentient
Property:
A
Novel
Animal
Law
Proposal,
JAVMA
NEWS,
Sept.
15,
2004,
http://www.avma.org/onlnews/javma/sep04/040915j.asp (last visited Feb.
1, 2007). Matlack has proposed this category in a letter to the Texas Third
circuit court of appeals (letter on file with author), and the court made
reference to it in a 2004 case. See Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., v. Schuster,
144 S.W.3d 554, 561 n.6 (Tex. App. 2004), and Matlack, Letter. Matlack
expands on her ideas in her book, We’ve Got Feelings Too (Log Cabin Press
2006).

See Matlack, Letter, supra note 317. In her letter to the Texas court,
Matlack explains: “This reclassification allows an incremental increase in the
legal status of companion animals, recognizing that they have feelings and
emotions without upsetting the judicial system and the rest of the scientific
and legal communities that currently classify animals as plain property.” Id.
316

A similar limitation can be found in Tennessee’s T-Bo Act, TENN.
CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(b) (2007).
317
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were met.318 Additional companion animals might include
backyard horses, parrots and other tropical birds, “pocket pets,”
such as ferrets, guinea pigs, hamsters, rabbits, and pot-bellied
pigs.
Once this new category is defined by the animals to which it
would apply, its legal effect needs to be shaped. In many ways,
this category would simply conform to legal trends that have
already occurred in areas of animal cruelty law and estates law.
In other ways, and in other areas of law, the category would
have additional legal effects of its own. Statutes that make
cruelty to animals a criminal offense, that create affirmative
duties to the animals we keep in our homes, and that allow us to
leave enforceable trusts to our pets already recognize that these
animals are in a different legal category from inanimate
property, even if that category has not yet been named. The
companion animal property category would encourage these
legal trends to continue and would provide a more rational
terminology to support these trends in the law.
The new category will create additional legal effects in areas
such as tort law, lost and found animal disputes, and custody
upon marriage dissolution. Courts would no longer need to be
constrained by the “mere property” label in awarding damages
that recognize the bond between people and their companion
animals.319 Decisions about who gets custody of a lost and
found animal would be based on principles that are not about
property ownership, but would rather look at who has formed a
closer bond to the animal, or who can provide a better home for
it. Following the lead of the Vermont Supreme Court,320 these
decisions could take into account the importance of encouraging
finders of lost animals to care for and develop relationships with
them. And custody awards could take into account the animal’s
attachment to each spouse and the animal’s best interest,
avoiding decisions such as the recent Pennsylvania one denying
a visitation and shared custody request because it was
318 Such criteria could include evidence of the animal’s bond with its
human owner, where it lives, how often the person and animal interact, and
veterinary records that show how the animal has been cared for.
319

See Bueckner v. Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368, 377-78 (Tex. App. 1994).

320

See Morgan v. Kroupa, 702 A.2d 630, 633 (Vt. 1997).
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“analogous, in law, to a visitation schedule for a table or a
lamp.”321

D. SHOULD COURTS OR LEGISLATURES ENACT CHANGES TO
ANIMALS’ LEGAL STATUS?
A debate exists among those who advocate changing the legal
status of animals about whether such changes ought to be
judicially or legislatively enacted.322 Matlack, for example,
presents her “sentient property” proposal as a compromise for
judges who want to move beyond laws that treat animals as
inanimate property.323 Other commentators have suggested
various options for legislative change.324 While the notion of
incremental judge-made changes has certain appeal, experience
has shown that such change with regards to the status of animal
happens slowly, if at all. A number of judges who seemed to be
open to the idea of changing animals’ legal status have
nevertheless claimed to be constrained by precedent; some have
directly deferred to the legislature to enact new laws.325 For this
and other reasons, legislative change seems to make the most
sense. The experience with legislatively-enacted enforceable
trusts and with legislation that increases animal cruelty offenses
to felonies shows that legislation protecting the interests of
companion animals can be effective.
321

See Desanctis v. Pritchard, 803 A.2d 230, 232 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).

See, e.g., Wise, One Step at a Time, supra note 294, at 28-29; see
generally ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 18.
322

323 See Carolyn B. Matlack, The Sentient (Feeling) Property Solution:
Unleashing Sensible Legal Respect for Companion Animals (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (“While our ‘judge-made’ or ‘common law’
prides itself in being able to change and grow with the times, the actual
process is replete with fits and starts . . . . Without suggestion of another
acceptable way to do it, judges are compelled by existing case law precedent
to come to the same old outdated decisions.” Id. at 1).
324

See, e.g., Waisman & Newell, supra note 40, at 71-73.

325 See, e.g., Koester v. VCA Animal Hosp. 624 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2001); Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. Schuster, 144 S.W.3d 554, 565
(Tex. App. 2004).
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Another reason to favor legislative change is that the
legislation can at the same time address the concerns of those
who seem most opposed to any formal change in the legal status
of animals. There has been some organized opposition to
changing the legal status of animals by the veterinary
community, much of which seems to be driven by malpractice
concerns. If the source of this opposition can be alleviated by
addressing the fear of increased malpractice premiums by
including caps on damage awards in any legislative change, then
perhaps much of the opposition would dissipate. Similarly, the
opposition to change that has come from the research
community326 would likely be alleviated if changes to the status
of companion animals were narrowly defined in a way that did
not affect their research interests. Limiting the animals to
which such changes would apply both by species and by their
roles in the lives of humans would respond, at least in part, to
many of the concerns raised by the research community.327
One obstacle to legislative change that might be difficult to
overcome is the Council of State Government’s recently adopted
Resolution
on
Animal
Guardianship
and Liability
326 See, e.g., National Ass’n for Biomedical Research, Animal Law
Section, http://www.nabr.org/AnimalLaw/index.htm (last visited Feb. 12,
2007); Steve Michael, Animal Personhood – A Threat to Research?, 47
PHYSIOLOGIST 447, 449 (2004), available at http://www.theaps.org/publications/tphys/images/tphys12x04.pdf (last visited Feb. 12,
2007).
327 Organizations representing animal researchers perceive many of the
recent changes in various areas of animal law as a “clear threat to animal
research.” See Michael, supra note 329, at 449. To respond to this threat, a
number of scientific organizations have initiated a project that is coordinated
through the National Association for Biomedical Research. Id. The project’s
stated goal “is to be fully prepared when and if a significant ‘personhood’ or
other ‘animal law’ case is brought before a federal or state court.” Id.
Because this article’s proposed change does not suggest that animals be given
personhood status, it may be of less concern to this community. This group
seems opposed, however, to what it sees as the “long-term, step-by-step
strategy” of the animal rights movement to move toward legal personhood,
citing changes from non-economic damage awards to enforceable trusts for
pets to changes from “owner” to “guardian” language.” Id. at 447. Given this
view, it is likely that these researchers would view any incremental change as
suspect, even if it were narrowly constructed to avoid any conflicts with their
interest in animal research.
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Legislation.328 Asserting that the proper balance between
responsible animal care and the rights of pet owners and
livestock producers can already be found within the existing
legal framework, and that this balance is being threatened by
those who want to give personhood rights to animals and who
advocate for the recovery of non-economic damages in tort cases
involving injured animals, the Council formally opposes two
types of legislative change: (1) “legislation that reclassifies pet,
livestock or animal owners as guardians or that otherwise alters
the legal status of the animals,” and (2) “legislation permitting
the recovery of non-economic damages for the loss or injury of a
pet, livestock or other animal.”329
Given their stated opposition to legislation that “alters the
legal status of animals,” it is hard to imagine that this group
would not oppose the creation of a new legal category:
companion animal property. It would be important to present
the proposal as one that does not really effect actual change, but
merely codifies changes that are already occurring. In fact, the
argument should be that these are the very changes that have
created the current “healthy balance”330 between the rights of
animals and the rights of those who care for them. Formally
creating a category for companion animal property would help
to ensure that we do not return to the time when companion
animals were more likely to be viewed as fungible, throw-away
property, when penalties for animal abuse were less harsh and
even less likely to be enforced.
Overcoming opposition to legislative change will not
necessarily be easy. But if the legislation can be tailored to
address the major concerns of those who are most likely to
oppose it, and its passage can be presented as a logical next step
in protecting the interests of animals and reflecting the values of
those who care for and work with them, then the creation of the
legal category companion animal property might be feasible.
Contrasting this proposal with those that would go much farther
in extending rights to animals could help to garner additional
support.
328

See Council of State Governments, supra note 265.

329

Id.

330

See id.
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E. EFFECTS OF ADDITIONAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN AND
WITHIN SPECIES
Defining the legal category, companion animal property,
both by types of animal and by the animal’s role could
admittedly create additional distinctions both between and
within animal species. But it is important to realize that such
distinctions have always existed in our laws protecting animals,
and it is likely that they always will. There are good reasons for
many of the legal differences that exist between animal
species.331 The differences that exist based on how we use the
animals332 may be harder to justify, but they are a reality of our
current legal system that are unlikely to change anytime soon.
Many current laws already treat animals differently by
species. The Federal Animal Welfare Act, for example, regulates
the use of animals in research, the commercial sale and
transportation of animals, and exhibition of animals.333 These
animal protection provisions, however, only apply to certain
warm-blooded animals; all farm animals are exempted.334
331 See James Rachels, Drawing Lines, in ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 18,
at 163, and Rogers & Kaplan, supra note 283, at 175-176.

See discussion on different ways of classifying animals, including
classifying by use, in Duckler, supra note 40, at 216-20.
332

333

7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-59 (2007).

334 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g) (2007) defines the term animal for purposes of the
Animal Welfare Act:

The term “animal” means any live or dead dog, cat,
monkey (nonhuman primate mammal), guinea pig, hamster,
rabbit, or such other warm-blooded animal, as the Secretary
may determine is being used, or is intended for use, for
research, testing, experimentation, or exhibition purposes, or
as a pet; but such term excludes (1) birds, rats of the genus
Rattus, and mice of the genus Mus, bred for use in research,
(2) horses not used for research purposes, and (3) other farm
animals, such as, but not limited to livestock or poultry, used
or intended for use as food or fiber, or livestock or poultry
used or intended for use for improving animal nutrition,
breeding, management, or production efficiency, or for
improving the quality of food or fiber. With respect to a dog,
the term means all dogs including those used for hunting,
security, or breeding purposes.
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Horses are covered by the Act, but only if they are used for
research purposes. Another provision of the Act, known as the
“Pet Theft Act,” aims to prevent pet animals being stolen and
sold for research; these sections only apply to dogs and cats.335
This law, therefore, makes clear distinctions among animal
species, and, in the case of horses, by how the animal is used.
Different treatment of animals can also be seen in a number
of states’ animal cruelty statutes. In Pennsylvania, for example,
recent amendments to the animal protection law apply harsher
penalties for harm to dogs and cats, whether the animal belongs
to the offender or someone else.336 While some would propose
applying these increased penalties to all animals, one specific
proposed bill would further increase penalties for harm to a
guide dog,337 not only maintaining the distinction by species, but
adding an additional distinction based on how the animal is
used.
Most of the recent changes in the law apply only to cases of
companion animals. Creating a legal category to codify those
changes would additionally codify the different treatment of
animals both between and within species. And, while some
judges have expressed concern about creating additional
distinctions both within and between species,338 many courts,

335

7 U.S.C. § 2158 (2007).

336

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5511(a)(1), (2.1) (2006).

337

H.R. 1911, 189th Leg., 2005-2006 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005).

In several of the cases cited in Parts II and III, courts have expressed
concern about these distinctions both within and between species. In
Morgan v. Kroupa, one judge dissented from the majority’s holding that the
“stray beast” language in Vermont’s property law statute did not apply to pet
dogs:
338

[A] clear line cannot always be drawn between animals
kept for economic reasons and those kept as pets. Many
people who keep livestock become emotionally attached to
individual animals. Conversely, dogs may be owned
primarily or solely for their economic value as work dogs or
breeding stock. And there are animals that fall somewhere
in between, such as pleasure horses —livestock that are not
kept for their economic value, but are, in effect, large pets.
To separate some species of domesticated animals from
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legislatures,339 and commentators340 accept both the need for
and the inevitability of such distinctions.341 Thus, the additional
distinctions that this new category would create between and
within species should not stand in the way of moving forward
with these legal changes.

PART V: THE IMPACT OF A NEW LEGAL STATUS
FOR COMPANION ANIMALS ON THE VETERINARY
PROFESSION
This section explores the implications that the creation of a
new legal category, companion animal property, might have on
the veterinary profession. Since there has already been some
others on an attempted livestock-pet dichotomy is a purely
arbitrary interpretation of the statute.
Morgan v. Kroupa, 702 A.2d 630, 636 (Vt. 1997) (Gibson, J., dissenting).
Similarly, one of the reasons that the Wisconsin Supreme Court gave for
refusing to extend emotional distress damages for the loss of a dog was that it
saw “no just stopping point”: “Were we to recognize a claim for damages for
the negligent loss of a dog, we can find little basis for rationally
distinguishing other categories of animal companion.” Rabideau v. City of
Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 799 (Wis. 2001).
339

See also Tennessee’s T-Bo Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403 (West

2006).
340 See, e.g., Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best Friend, supra note
17, at 84-88 (discussing various laws that distinguish among animals based
on their value to humans); Huss, Valuation in Veterinary Malpractice,
supra note 9, at 533-535 (discussing different legal treatment of companion
animals and food-producing animals, and proposing a new statutory
provision for non-economic damages in veterinary malpractice actions that
continues to treat animals differently by species).
341 A New York bill proposed in January 2003 that would have allowed
pets to recover damages for pain, suffering and loss of faculties was limited to
dogs, cats, and “domestic animals receiving regular care.” These limitations
were justified, in part, by the greater political support for dogs and cats over
farm animals and the fewer economic interests at stake. See R. Scott Nolen,
Legislation Presses Limits of Animal Status in New York: Harmed Pets
Would be Entitled to Compensation, JAVMA NEWS, May 15, 2004, available
at http://www.avma.org/onlnews/javma/may04/040515q.asp (last visited
Feb. 17, 2007).
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organized opposition in the veterinary community to changing
the legal status of animals,342 and since strong veterinary
opposition is likely to impede any real change in this area,343 it is
important to look at how such a change might actually affect
veterinarians. This group would be less inclined to oppose such
changes, and might even support them, if it sees that it is
ultimately in the best interests of the profession to raise the
status of companion animals above that of inanimate property.
Certainly, changes in the way we value companion animals in
our society are already having both positive and negative
impacts on the profession. Owners of companion animals are
more likely to spend money on both preventative and curative
veterinary care, and this increased willingness has helped to
support the increased specialization in veterinary medicine.344
But such owners are also more likely to have higher expectations
for what veterinary medicine can accomplish, and they may be
more likely to bring a malpractice claim if they are unhappy with
the outcome.345 The profession will continue to experience
these effects whether or not the legal status of companion
animals changes. This section will address the ways in which
changing the law to reflect society’s changing values may affect
veterinary medicine and education in ways that that go beyond
the changes in societal values themselves.

A. VETERINARY OPPOSITION TO CHANGING THE LEGAL
STATUS OF ANIMALS
The American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) has
expressed its opposition to changes in the legal status of animals
in several position statements and resolutions. As discussed in
Section III(B)(5) above, the AVMA adopted a resolution in 2003
342

See supra notes 261-265 and accompanying text.

343

See Green, supra note 3, at 167.

344 See Green, supra note 3, at 209.
See also Huss, Valuation in
Veterinary Malpractice, supra note 9, at 484-86, and McEachern Nunalee &
Weedon, supra note 6, at 138-39.

Huss, Valuation in Veterinary Malpractice, supra note 9, at 494-495;
McEachern Nunalee & Weedon, supra note 6, at 138.
345
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opposing any legislation that changes the terminology
describing a person’s relationship with her animals from
“owner” to “guardian.”346 The resolution claims that such
change could weaken individuals’ relationships with their
animals, limit veterinarians’ ability to provide services, “and,
ultimately, result in animal suffering.”347 And in a 2003
statement setting out the AVMA’s position on whether damage
awards for injured animals should exceed their property value,
the organization declared its support for the legal concept of
animals as property, while recognizing that “some animals have
value to their owners that may exceed the animal’s market
value.”348 This statement apparently received limited support
from the AVMA Executive Board, passing only after the Board’s
Chair cast a tie-breaking vote.349
Given all that veterinarians have gained, and will continue to
gain, from the increased valuation of pets, it might seem curious
that there is so much organized opposition to both changes in
pets’ legal status and to their valuation above fair market value.
The most likely explanation for this opposition seems to lie in
the profession’s concerns that increased status and valuation of
animals will lead to an increased exposure to large malpractice
awards against veterinarians.350 Veterinarians seem to be
concerned that increasing the status and value of animals will
346

See supra note 263 and accompanying text.

347

See AVMA Opposes ‘Pet Guardianship,’ supra note 263.

See
Executive
Board
Coverage:
Several
Factors
at
Play when Determining Compensatory Value of Animals, AVMA
Says,
JAVMA
NEWS,
July
1,
2003,
available
at
http://www.avma.org/onlnews/javma/jul03/030701j.asp (last visited Feb.
12, 2007). The position statement goes on to suggest factors to consider in
determining an animal’s monetary value, all of which are essentially of an
economic nature.
348

Id. The dissenters opined that “the statement focused too much on
economic factors while not adequately accounting for the relationship
between people and animals.” Id.
349

350 See Green, supra note 3, at 216 (discussing the veterinarian
profession’s “fear of limitless liability, of replicating the human medical
malpractice ‘crisis;’ of inviting frivolous lawsuits; or even of being forced out
of business”).
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mean that pet owners are more likely to bring suits when their
pets are injured or killed, and that the amounts of damage
awards will continue to increase.351 Both of these phenomena,
they claim, will lead to a rise in malpractice premiums that will
make the cost of veterinary care prohibitive to the average pet
owner.352

B. RESPONSES TO VETERINARY OPPOSITION
There are several responses to this position. One argument
is that it is simply disingenuous for veterinarians, whose
profession has achieved so much because of the increased status
of animals, to say that these animals are really just property.353
The awkwardness of such a position has not been lost on the
veterinary profession itself, as seen in this statement of
veterinarian James Wilson:
Veterinarians must accept that they can no
longer promote expenditures of time, money and
emotional energy by owners . . . and then when
something goes awry simply say, “Oh well, tough
luck Mrs. Jones. It’s just an animal under the law.
Animals are merely personal property; therefore
you may not collect damages for your loss, other
than the market value of your pet.”354
A similar understanding can be found in the charge of a
recently approved AVMA Task Force on the Legal Status of
Animals, which will recommend an AVMA policy position on
animals’ status and valuation.355 Apparently meant to update
and amend the 2003 resolution and policy statements discussed
351 See Huss, Valuation in Veterinary Malpractice, supra note 9, at 493495 (discussing reasons for increases in veterinary malpractice claims).
352

See McEachern Nunalee & Weedon, supra note 6, at 159-60.

353

See Waisman & Newell, supra note 40, at 70-71.

354

Green, supra note 3, at 215 (quoting Dr. James Wilson).

355 See Executive Board Coverage: Task force on Legal Status
of
Animals
Approved,
JAVMA
NEWS,
July
15,
2004,
http://www.avma.org/onlnews/javma/jul04/040715j.asp (last visited Feb.
12, 2007).
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above, the task force is charged with looking at both the pros
and cons of non-economic damage awards, determining when
such awards are appropriate, and developing a list of legal
protections that would be needed should guardianship laws be
applied to animals.356 The creation of the task force was driven,
at least in part, by concerns about how the public will perceive
veterinarian opposition to initiatives changing the status and
valuation of animals.357 The profession seems rightly concerned
that such opposition could easily damage its credibility.358
Some critics of such veterinary opposition go even further,
arguing that veterinarians have engaged in professional
complicity to increase the public’s perceived value of companion
animals, actively promoting the human-animal bond,359 and
they are therefore in no position to deny that such a bond exists
when advocating against change in animals’ legal status.
Evidence of the veterinary profession’s recognition of the
importance of the human-animal bond can be seen in the
curricula of a number of veterinary schools (some of which have
even established centers on the human-animal bond), and on
the amount of research studying this bond.360
A further argument against such veterinary opposition is that
its conclusion – that increasing animals’ status and value will
lead to increased malpractice premiums that will either drive
them out of business or make the cost of veterinary care
prohibitive – is based on a faulty premise. One commentator
who has researched and crunched the numbers concludes that
the effect of higher damage awards on malpractice premiums –
especially if those awards are subject to a legislative cap – is
likely to be negligible.361 Veterinarians seem to be using the
356

Id.

357

Id.

358

See Green, supra note 3, at 215.

359

See Green, supra note 3, at 212-213.

360

See supra notes 288-289.

361 See Green, supra note 3, at 218. In one scenario, if non-economic
damages were allowed, but capped at $25,000, each veterinarian’s annual
premiums would rise by only $212, which would translate to an annual
increase of only thirteen cents for each pet owner. Using the same figures,

397

Winter 2007

Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy

Vol 4:2

“malpractice crisis” in human medicine as their guide. But
while there is hardly universal agreement that malpractice has
reached crisis proportions in human medicine, there is even less
evidence that such will be the case in veterinary medicine if the
valuation or status of companion animals formally changes.
Finally, returning to this author’s proposal that companion
animal property become a recognized legal category, it is not
clear that simply creating such a category will have an effect on
veterinary malpractice separate from the societal values and
legal trends that already exist. The recent cases that have
allowed high damage awards for negligent harm to companion
animals have not depended on any change in the animal’s legal
status. Courts have shown a willingness to value this type of
property well above its “fair market value” by allowing recovery
of reasonable veterinary expenses (which seems ultimately to be
a benefit to the veterinary profession) and by looking at the
animal’s actual value to its owner – a valuation that does not
depend on a status different from other property.362
If veterinary malpractice premiums are in fact destined to
rise, the increase will be only partly attributable to changes in
the law. Much of any increase in malpractice may simply be due
to the fact that animal owners are valuing their animal more and
expecting more from veterinary care.363 And if the real concern
is increased damages, then any legislative change to companion
animals’ legal status can be accompanied by a cap on damage
awards, which will go a long way toward alleviating any pending
veterinary malpractice “crisis.” More importantly, however,
being driven by malpractice concerns seems to be a very shortsighted way to stake out a position on whether there should be a
change in the legal status of animals. Veterinarians would likely
reap numerous other benefits from such changes in status.
but positing a much more drastic increase in malpractice premiums of ten
times the current amount, would only yield a fifty-two cent increase for each
companion animal in the U.S. See id. at 219.
See supra notes 52-66 and accompanying text. In other contexts,
however, there have been enough court decisions where judges seem to be
constrained by the property label that there may be value, separate from its
potential effect on malpractice awards, in changing that label. See, e.g.,
footnotes 104-105 and accompanying text.
362

363

See Huss, Valuation in Veterinary Malpractice, supra note 9, at 494.
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C. POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO THE VETERINARY PROFESSION
OF CHANGING THE LEGAL STATUS OF COMPANION ANIMALS
The formal opposition that veterinarians and veterinary
associations have raised to any change in the legal status of
companion animals may say more about how deeply ingrained
are their fears of litigation and the “malpractice crisis” than
about how most veterinarians view their role with regard to the
animals they treat. If malpractice concerns were alleviated,
with, for example, legislative caps on damages or other “tort
reform” measures that have been proposed with regard to
human medicine, it is likely that many more veterinarians would
favor changing the legal status of companion animals.
Veterinarians, particularly the majority who treat companion
animals, have a great deal to gain from a formal recognition that
the animals they treat have a status that is fundamentally
different from inanimate property. Such a change would likely
have a positive effect on the professional role of veterinarians,
raising both the prestige of the veterinary profession and the
remuneration of practitioners. This change would lead to more
consistency both in the way that veterinarians view themselves
as professionals and with the realities of their practice, and it
would help to eliminate many of the problems they can face
when their professional judgment is constrained by the
sometimes irrational choices of animal owners.
The veterinarian’s professional role has been described as
being somewhere along a spectrum that compares the
veterinarian’s role, on one end, to that of the garage mechanic,
and on the other end, to a pediatrician.364 This garage mechanic
vs. pediatrician model has been set out by Bernard Rollin, a
philosopher who teaches Veterinary Ethics at Colorado State
Veterinary School.365 As Rollin explains the choices:
If a person brings a car to a mechanic and the
mechanic determines that the vehicle will cost five
thousand dollars to repair, it is perfectly
permissible for the owner to declare “Five
thousand dollars? The hell with it! Junk it!” On
the other hand, if a parent brings a child to a
364

See ROLLIN, supra note 2, at 32.

365

See ROLLIN, supra note 2.
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pediatrician and the physician determines that the
child needs five thousand dollars’ worth of surgery,
the pediatrician certainly doesn’t allow the parent
to say, “The hell with the kid! Junk ‘em! I can
make another one.”366
The reality of course, is that veterinarians are neither garage
mechanics nor pediatricians.
Their professional role is
somewhere in between these two extremes, and where on the
spectrum it falls may depend on the nature of their practice.367
The point of Rollin’s analogy, however, is clear. As society’s
view of companion animals’ status increases, and as more pet
owners view their animals like members of the family, the more
appropriate the pediatrician model seems. But our current laws
that view animals as simply another form of personal property
are more in line with the garage mechanic model.368 The
profession stands to gain in a number of ways if veterinarians
are treated more like pediatricians.
Raising the legal status of companion animals to something
more valued than inanimate property can raise the prestige of
the veterinary profession in a number of ways. Veterinary
training is similar, in many respects, to medical training.369 In
Id. at 32. Rollin’s analogy describes precisely the dilemma with which
pet owners, treating veterinarians, and sometimes courts are faced when an
animal with little or no market value requires expensive treatment to repair
harm that results from a wrongdoer’s negligence.
366

367 To extend Rollin’s analogy a bit further and at the same time risk oversimplifying, if veterinarians who treat companion animals are seen as closer
to the pediatrician model, and those who treat food animals are viewed as
closer to the garage mechanic model, then those who treat very valuable race
horses are like garage mechanics who work on very expensive luxury cars.
368 See, e.g., Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). When
animal owners cannot even recover veterinary expenses to treat animals
harmed by the tortious conduct of others because the law says they cannot
recover more than the animal’s “replacement value,” then veterinarians are
essentially being treated like garage mechanics.
369 See Price v. Brown, 680 A.2d 1149, 1551-1552 (Pa. 1996) (holding that
professional negligence standards, not bailment law, apply to allegations of
negligence against a veterinarian because, like the practice of medicine, “the
vocation of veterinary medicine involves specialized education, knowledge,
and skills.”).
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fact, there are many ways in which veterinarians see themselves
as more skilled than physicians who practice human medicine.
Physicians, unlike veterinarians, only need to know how to treat
one species. Additionally, it is harder to get into a veterinary
school than to get into medical school.370 Despite these
differences, salaries of veterinarians lag well behind those of
physicians, which fact likely has much to do with the legal status
of the “patients” they treat. If this status were to change, even
incrementally, the prestige and remuneration of veterinarians
would likely improve.
A similar improvement was seen in both the social status and
compensation of lab animal veterinarians in the wake of federal
laws regulating the treatment of laboratory animals.371 When
changes to the Animal Welfare Act were being considered that
would regulate the treatment of lab animals through the use of
institutional animal care committees and other efforts to
minimize the pain and suffering of these animals, the proposed
changes initially met with opposition from laboratory animal
veterinary associations.372 After the Animal Welfare Act was
amended, however, the salaries of laboratory animal
veterinarians increased markedly, as did their job satisfaction
and job security.373 They also reported that after the law’s
passage, their advice was more often heeded.374 In this case, it
was the legal changes that improved the status – through
370 Much of the difficulty of getting in to veterinary schools can be
explained by the fact that there are only a total of 32 veterinary schools in
both the U.S. and Canada combined. See Association of American Veterinary
Medical Colleges, Students & Admissions, Member Institutions,
http://www.aavmc.org/students_admissions/vet_schools.htm (last visited
March 2, 2007). See also Association of American Veterinary Medical
Colleges, Veterinary Medical School Admission Requirements (VMSAR),
http://www.aavmc.org/vmcas/VMSAR_publications.htm (last visited March
2, 2007) (Veterinary Medical School Admission Requirements (VMSAR)
contains admission requirements and contact information for all 32 U.S. and
Canadian veterinary medical colleges.”)
371

See ROLLIN, supra note 2, at 48.

372

See id.

373

Id. at 49.

374

Id.
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improved protections – of laboratory animals that precipitated
the improvement in both the status and compensation of the
veterinarians who treated these animals.
Some improvements in the status and salaries of companion
animal veterinarians are already resulting from the expansion in
the way society values companion animals. Pet owners’
increased willingness to spend money on their animals’ care is,
not surprisingly, resulting in increased remuneration,375 and
likely increased regard toward veterinarians who treat
companion animals. Not only are these practitioners benefiting
financially, the therapeutic options they can offer are also
expanding because of the increased valuation of animals.376
And, despite the fact that farm animals greatly outnumber pets
and companion animals,377 the vast majority of veterinarians
practice only or mostly with companion animals.378 A change in
See Green, supra note 3, at 209 (reporting that “[i]n the last 10 years
alone, the gross revenue of companion animal exclusive practices has more
than doubled, with 60% of this increase occurring just in the last four years.”
(footnote omitted)).
375

376 See id. at 210. See also ROLLIN, supra note 2, at 68 (“As the moral
status, and moral worth, of animals in society increase, there will be ever
greater social pressure and expectations to treat animals – at least
companion animals. . . . As the value of animals rises in society, so will the
value of those who treat animals, and so too will the opportunities to
actualize the scientific medicine veterinarians have evolved.”).
377 See NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T. AGRIC., 2002 CENSUS
AGRICULTURE. pt. 51, at 6 tbl.1, 23 tbl.27, 23 tbl.29 (2004),available at
http://www.nass.usda.gov/census/census02/volume1/us/USVolume104.pdf
(last visited Feb. 12, 2007) (listing the livestock inventory in the United
States in 2002 as almost 2 billion animals, consisting in part of 95,497,994
cattle, 60,405,103 hogs and pigs, 334,435,155 layer hens, 1,389,279,047
broiler chickens, 93,028,191 turkeys, and 6,341,799 sheep), and American
Veterinary
Medical
Association,
Veterinary
Market
Statistics,
http://www.avma.org/membshp/marketstats/comp_exotic.asp (last visited
Jan. 27, 2007) (listing the companion animals in the United States in 2001 as
over 147 millions animals, consisting in part of 61,572,000 dogs, 70,796,000
cats, 10,105,000 birds, and 5,107,000 horses).

OF

378 See Green, supra note 3, at 211 (reporting that “over 83% of
veterinarians in private practice now work either exclusively or
predominantly with companion animals – as contrasted with the 12% who
work exclusively with agricultural animals and the 4% who care exclusively
for horses.”).
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the legal status of companion animals that codifies society’s
increased regard for these animals can only continue to improve
the status and salaries of companion animal veterinarians.
Raising the legal status of companion animals to something
above that of inanimate property would also be more consistent
with way veterinarians view themselves as professionals. When
Rollin has presented his pediatricians vs. truck mechanic model
to veterinarians, he has found that over ninety percent lean
toward the pediatrician model.379
This is perhaps not
surprising, given that most veterinarians work in companion
animal rather than agricultural practices. The law’s treatment of
animals as property, however, treats veterinarians, in many
respects, more closely to the way it treats others who repair
inanimate property.
Recognizing that the status of animals should be different
from other forms of property is also consistent with the view of
the veterinary profession reflected in the code of ethics of the
American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA).380 The code
contains a number of references to the principle that a
practitioner’s primary obligation is to her animal patients. The
first provision of the Professional Behavior section of the code
sets out the following obligation: “Veterinarians should first
consider the needs of the patient: to relieve disease, suffering or
disability while minimizing pain or fear.”381 This provision, not
unlike the Hippocratic Oath’s “first, do no harm,” highlights the
important role that veterinarians, like doctors, play in treating
their patients’ diseases and injuries. Considering the needs of
the patient first is certainly different from any kind of obligation
or ethic that a professional whose work involves repairing
inanimate property would have.
Another provision of the AVMA ethics code, regulating
influences on judgment, sets out a similar obligation: “The
choice of treatment or animal care should not be influenced by
379

ROLLIN, supra note 2, at 33.

380 AMERICAN VETERINARY MEDICAL ASS’N, PRINCIPLES OF VETERINARY
MEDICAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN VETERINARY MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (2003),
available at http://www.avma.org/issues/policy/ethics.asp (last visited Feb.
12, 2007) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF VETERINARY MEDICAL ETHICS].
381

Id. at § II(A).
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considerations other than the needs of the patient, the welfare of
the client, and the safety of the public.”382 While recognizing
that public safety concerns, along with the client-owner’s
welfare (which presumably includes inability to pay for
expensive treatments) can influence treatment choices, this
provision begins, however, by considering the “needs of the
patient.” The language choices alone are instructive: the code’s
use of the term “patient” certainly envisions a professional role
that is closer to its counterpart in human medicine than to the
mechanic who works on a car or truck.
Elevating the legal status of animals is not only more
consistent with most veterinarians’ view of their own
professional role, it is also more consistent with the reality of
today’s veterinary practice. No longer primarily serving the
utilitarian needs of the agricultural industry,383 the current face
of veterinary medicine involves practices that serve primarily
companion animals, with an increasing reliance on specialty
practices.384 Dogs and cats now benefit from increasingly
sophisticated diagnostic techniques including MRIs and digital
imaging.385 Treatment options include surgery, chemotherapy,
and radiation treatments for cancer, hip replacements and other
complicated surgeries for orthopedic problems, and even
dialysis and kidney transplants to treat kidney disease.386
Clearly, neither the pet owners who choose these sophisticated
and expensive treatments, nor the veterinarians who practice
them, are regarding the animals being treated as just another
form of property. The legal status of animals needs to better
reflect this perception, giving it more credibility, better intuitive
appeal, and all-around coherence.
382

Id. at § V(A).

See ROLLIN, supra note 2, at 58-59; McEachern Nunalee & Weedon,
supra note 6, at 138.
383

See Green, supra note 3, at 210-11; McEachern Nunalee & Weedon,
supra note 6, at 138-139.
384

385 See Mary Battiata, Whose Life Is It Anyway?, WASH. POST, Aug. 29,
2004, at W16 (Magazine), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A30131-2004Aug24.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2007).
386

Id.
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Academic veterinary practice recognizes the non-property
status of animals in even more direct ways. A number of
veterinary schools now include departments or centers that
focus on the human-animal bond. At the University of
California at Davis, for example, the Center for Animals in
Society supports research on areas such as therapeutic and
health effects of pets and their role in human development,387
and includes resources such as the Program for Veterinary
Family practice.388 Highlighted on the Center’s main web page
is the declaration, “the inspiration for our activities is the
ongoing evolution of the roles animals play in our complex
human society.389 A similar program was established at the
University of Pennsylvania’s School of Veterinary Medicine in
1997. Penn’s Center for the Interaction of Animals and Society
(CIAS) describes itself as a multi-disciplinary research center
whose goal is
to promote understanding of human-animal
interactions and relationships across a wide range
of contexts . . . [by] [s]tudy[ing] the positive and
negative influence of people’s relationships with
animals on their physical and mental health and
well being . . . [and] [i]nvestigat[ing] the impact of
these relationships on the behavior and welfare of
the animals involved.390

387 See University of California, Davis, Center for Animals in Society,
Research,
http://www.vetmed.ucdavis.edu/Animals_in_Society/Research.htm
(last
visited Feb. 12, 2007).
388 See
University
of
California,
Davis,
Center
for
Animals
in
Society,
About
the
Center,
http://www.vetmed.ucdavis.edu/Animals_in_Society/about.htm
(last
visited Feb. 12, 2007).

University of California, Davis, Center for Animals in Society, Home
Page, http://www.vetmed.ucdavis.edu/Animals_in_Society/main.htm (last
visited Feb. 12, 2007).
389

390 University of Pennsylvania School of Veterinary Medicine, Center for
the Interaction of Animals & Society, About the Center,
http://www2.vet.upenn.edu/research/centers/cias/ (last visited Feb. 12,
2007).
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Clearly, the development and support for such centers
reflects a recognition within the academic veterinary community
that the animals they treat are very different from the cars and
trucks that mechanics repair. Creating a legal category that
recognizes this different status would bring the law more in line
with a reality that veterinary schools have long understood.
Veterinarians could also benefit from an improved legal
status of companion animals because such a status could help to
alleviate some of the problems they face when their treatment
options are controlled by the sometimes irrational and harmful
choices that client-owners can make. When animals are viewed
as property by the law, any choice of how to treat (or not to
treat) an animal is basically the owner’s to make, even if that
choice is very much against the animal’s interest. Only in the
rare case where the owner’s treatment choice violates an animal
cruelty statute391 can that choice be overridden. And because
humane euthanasia is considered a standard, and in fact ethical,
treatment choice in veterinary medicine,392 there is ultimately
little that a veterinarian can do when a client requests that a
healthy animal be euthanized, even for the most trivial of
reasons.393 While courts have found ways to invalidate such
requests as “against public policy” when they come in the form
of testamentary provisions,394 there is little that can be done
under current laws to dissuade living clients from finding
someone who will perform what has been dubbed “convenience
euthanasia.”395
If, for example, a horse owner, against her veterinarian’s advice,
wanted to transport a sore-footed horse to a different location, the
veterinarian who fears that such a decision would be harmful to the horse
would have little recourse unless the transportation would be so harmful that
it would violate a provision of that state’s cruelty statute against transporting
any animal in a cruel or inhumane manner. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5511(e) (West 2006).
391

See PRINCIPLES OF VETERINARY MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 383, § X
(“Humane euthanasia of animals is an ethical veterinary procedure.”).
392

393

See ROLLIN, supra note 2, at 33, 59, 62.

394 See supra notes 174-1977 and accompanying text (discussing judicial
decisions voiding testamentary clauses instructing that animals be
destroyed).
395

See ROLLIN, supra note 2, at 62.
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Rollin reports that the request to euthanize healthy animals
is the most stressful and demoralizing part of companion animal
practice.396
Some of the real examples of convenience
euthanasia that he cites are just horrific: “clients going on
vacation and not wanting to pay boarding fees, or clients tired of
an adult dog and wanting a puppy, or clients who have
redecorated and the dog doesn’t match the color scheme.”397
Choices such as these, awful as they may sound, are essentially
supported by our current legal scheme that regards animals just
like other pieces of personal property. But while few would
question the choice to get rid of a couch because it doesn’t match
the dog, there just seems to be something wrong about killing a
dog because it doesn’t match the new couch. One way to limit
such choices is by elevating the legal status of companion animal
so that they cannot be treated just like any other form of
property.
A new legal category for companion animal property could
respond to the need to better educate people who might choose
to have pets when it is convenient, but who would then choose
to euthanize them when it is not. This goal is consistent with the
educational goals of the “owner-to-guardian” campaign –
helping pet owners to understand that they have greater
responsibilities to their pets than to their inanimate property.398
Such understanding would be beneficial to the veterinary
profession because it could help to reduce the stress they face
when asked to euthanize healthy animals.399
396

Id.

397

Id.

See Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1979).
398

399 Although part of the opposition raised by veterinary groups to the use
of guardianship language was the concern that owners would have less
control over medical decision-making for their pets, it is unlikely that such
decision-making would face interference unless the owner were making
unreasonable choices. If we look to pediatric decision-making as a model,
parents’ decisions regarding their children’s medical care are rarely
interfered with, and then only if they are putting their children in danger.

[P]arents generally “have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare [their children] for
additional obligations.” Surely, this includes a “high duty” to
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Another beneficial effect of this educational role might be to
reduce the number of unwanted dogs and cats in animal
shelters. While many members of the public view their animals
as family members, establishing strong bonds with them and
taking good care of them, there are others whose behavior
indicates that they still see companion animals as disposable
property.400 Our current laws do little to dissuade people from
this attitude. An understanding of pets as “companion animal
property” and the increased responsibilities that would come
with that understanding could go far in stopping both
“convenience euthanasia,” and revolving-door shelter adoption.
Veterinarians thus stand to gain in a number of ways from a
new legal status for companion animals. And there is likely to
be more support for this position if it can be accomplished in
ways that do not implicate their concerns of increased
malpractice liability or decreased control over their professional
choices. Carving out a new legal category such as “companion
animal property” could alleviate many of the concerns expressed
by those who oppose the language change from owner to
guardian. Unlike the term “guardian,” this new category has no
established legal meaning, and it could be precisely tailored so
that it achieves the beneficial effects that the veterinary
recognize symptoms of illness and to seek and follow medical
advice.
The law’s concept of the family rests on a
presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in
maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for
making life’s difficult decisions.
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (citations omitted).
There is no reason to expect any difference in the owner-animal
relationship. If anything, even with a legal status elevated above mere
property, but well short of personhood, it is likely that there will continue to
be much more deference to pet owners’ choices. The only choice that will be
interfered with will be those that are simply unjustifiable. Ultimately it
should be a benefit to veterinarians who treat companion animals to be able
to limit precisely these kinds of choices.
400 These behaviors include adopting animals from shelters, only to
return them at the slightest behavior problem, not taking adequate care of
their animals, and choosing humane euthanasia for trivial reasons. See, e.g.,
ELIZABETH HESS, LOST AND FOUND: DOGS, CATS, AND EVERYDAY HEROES AT A
COUNTRY ANIMAL SHELTER (Harvest Books 2006).

408

Winter 2007

Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy

Vol 4:2

profession would support, without the unintended consequences
that might come with an established legal term. In fact, some
veterinary groups that have opposed guardianship status have,
at the same time, registered their support for some change in the
legal status of animals. The Pennsylvania Veterinary Medical
Association, for example, approved several position statements
on March 9, 2005.401 One of these statements sets out their
opposition to the use of the term guardian.402 But the Position
Statement on Pets as Property, approved on the same day, sets
out their support for changing the property status of pets:
[W]e feel very strongly that animals are not
property in the same way that tables, lamps or cars
are property.
...
We further believe that an appropriate definition
of a pet must be developed prior to any changes or
expansions in the laws on damages for pet loss. In
our search of PA law and the laws of other states,
we have been unable to find an adequate definition
for a “pet” or “companion animal” that would
allow us to reach a consensus on the subject of
pets as property. PVMA is developing a definition
and welcomes comments from all interested
parties.403
This forward-looking group realizes that the profession, the
animals they treat, and the owners who care for those animals
all have much to gain from developing a new legal definition
that better captures the way that we as a society value our
companion animals.

401 See PENNSYLVANIA VETERINARY MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, POSITION
STATEMENTS (2005),
http://www.pavma.org/Images/05_Position_Stmnts_UNP.pdf (last visited
Feb. 12, 2007).
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403 Id. In an August 11, 2005 position statement, the PVMA did, in fact,
put forward a definition of “pet.” See PENNSYLVANIA VETERINARY MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION,
DEFINITION
OF
A
PET
(2006),
available
at
http://www.pavma.org/Images/06_Definition_of_Pet.pdf
(last
visited
March 2, 2007).
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CONCLUSION
Although the law has traditionally treated all animals as
property, there are an increasing number of areas where the
legal system is beginning to recognize that companion animals
are fundamentally different from other forms of property. These
changes in the law are just beginning to catch up with the way in
which our society values companion animals. We should
formally recognize these changes by creating a new legal
category for companion animals that better reflects their status
as somewhere between property and persons. Creating this new
category will help lead toward more consistent treatment of
animals across various areas of law, and treatment by the legal
system that will better reflect the way we value our animals.
While the veterinary community has in the past opposed any
change to the legal status of animals, professional veterinary
groups are now beginning to realize that such a change is not
only inevitable, but also desirable. Veterinary groups will
benefit by the creation of such a new legal category and by
helping to shape its parameters. It is in the profession’s best
interests to support and develop changes in the legal status of
companion animals because these changes will have a positive
effect on the professional role of veterinarians, will lead to more
consistency with the realities of their practices, and will give
them better opportunities to exercise their professional
judgment.
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